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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
One of the main goals of public health insurance expansions is to increase access to 
health care services, but doing so may require providers to move to previously 
underserved areas. Whether and to what extent any such relocation occurs remains an 
open question. In the first essay, I study how providers choose their practice locations in 
response to Medicaid expansions for one of the most common forms of primary care, 
dental care services. I find that expansions of adult Medicaid dental benefits increased the 
number of dentists per capita in poor counties relative to non-poor counties by 12 
percent, or 2.6 dentists per 100,000 population. The increase was larger in counties where 
the expansions generated greater financial incentives for dentists. 
      In the second essay, we investigate the implementation of Medicare Part D and 
estimate that this prescription drug benefit program reduced elderly mortality by 2.2 
percent annually. This was driven primarily by a reduction in cardiovascular mortality, 
the leading cause of death for the elderly. There was no effect on deaths due to cancer, a 
condition whose drug treatments are covered under Medicare Part B. We validate these 
results by demonstrating that the changes in drug utilization following the 
implementation of Medicare Part D match the mortality patterns we observe. We 
calculate that the value of the mortality reduction is equal to $5 billion per year. 
      In the third essay, we evaluate the effect of teenage driving laws on mortality using 
the minimum driving age in a regression discontinuity design. We estimate that gaining 
driving eligibility leads to an immediate increase in teenage mortality of 15 percent (8 per 
100,000). Many states have recently implemented Graduated Driving License (GDL) 
laws to reduce driving accidents. We estimate that these laws reduced teenage mortality 
by 8 percent (4 per 100,000). We calculate that the social benefit of this mortality 
reduction is equal to $1.5 billion annually. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the major goals of many government insurance programs and regulations in the
United States is to improve the well-being of its citizens, or ultimately to save lives.
For example, the Medicaid program serves as the main source of health insurance
for low-income families and individuals, and the Medicare program provides health
insurance to the elderly population over the age of 65. The first two essays of this
dissertation focus on the role of these public health insurance programs in improving
access to health care services and health outcomes, including mortality rates. The
third essay covers another area of government intervention that regulates the teenage
driver population on the road and a↵ects motor vehicle fatalities: driver licensing
laws. This dissertation, based on microeconomic theory and rigorous econometric
techniques, provides policymakers with a substantive evaluation of the costs and
benefits of di↵erent types of policies and regulations.
In the first essay, “Medicaid and Provider Supply,” I study how providers choose
their practice locations in response to Medicaid coverage expansions for adult dental
care services, one of the most common forms of primary care. Dental care is a class of
services that are frequently a↵ected by Medicaid expansions, and adult Medicaid den-
tal benefits vary substantially from state to state and year to year. Previous research
has shown that Medicaid dental expansions increased the potential customer base
and income for dentists. This suggests that the expansions may increase the supply
of dentists in areas with large, pre-existing adult Medicaid populations. At the same
time, however, Medicaid could crowd out more lucrative private insurance in theory.
Also, Medicaid incentives might not be large enough to impact location decisions of
dentists. I provide the first evidence that these expansions actually a↵ected dentists’
location decisions.
I employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences approach to estimate the e↵ect of
Medicaid incentives on dentist supply by exploiting changes in adult Medicaid dental
benefits across states and over time, and in the size of potential Medicaid populations.
I use data on the universe of dentists in the United States from 2006-2013. Following
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the Census Bureau’s definition, “poor” counties are defined as having poverty rates
of 20 percent or higher. I find that adult Medicaid dental expansions increased the
number of dentists per capita in poor counties relative to non-poor counties by 12
percent, or 2.6 dentists per 100,000 population. These e↵ects were concentrated
among poor and densely populated counties that had considerable exposure to the
expansions (i.e., large adult Medicaid populations). More generally, the impact of
Medicaid expansions on dentist supply exhibited heterogeneity by the size of the
change in financial incentives for dentists. Also, the majority of the e↵ect is driven by
private dentists. One of the original goals of the Medicaid program was to encourage
the private health care sector to provide services to low-income populations instead
of resorting to public institutions such as community health centers. By showing
that Medicaid expansions significantly attracted the supply of private practitioners
to areas where Medicaid coverage was prevalent, this paper provides evidence that
the expansions achieved one of the stated goals of the Medicaid program.
While my findings show that dentists responded strongly to financial incentives
when choosing practice locations, they also suggest that further incentives will be
needed to address the needs in the most underserved areas that are both poor and
sparsely populated; otherwise, these most underserved areas will continue to face
problems with access to services due to the lack of dentist supply. Finally, I find
no evidence that the estimated increases in dentist supply helped alleviate dentist
shortages. This is largely expected, because Medicaid incentives are correlated with
the size of potential Medicaid populations in the county, not necessarily with dentist
shortage area designations.
In the second essay, “Did Medicare Part D Reduce Mortality?,” we investigate the
e↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality, the ultimate indicator of health. Medicare
Part D is a prescription drug benefit program for the elderly population that was fully
implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services in 2006. Medicare Part
D currently serves 39 million Medicare beneficiaries and spends $70 billion, or $1,800
per beneficiary, per year. Importantly, prescription drugs represent an increasingly
valuable source of health care and over ninety percent of the elderly population con-
sumes prescription drugs at least once per month. Prior studies have documented that
this prescription drug benefit program significantly increased elderly drug insurance
coverage and drug utilization. For example, about one-fourth of the elderly popula-
tion gained prescription drug insurance between 2004 and 2007. However, the lack of
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major health benefits would limit the cost-e↵ectiveness of the program. We provide
the first evidence that the increase in drug utilization attributable to Medicare Part
D saved lives.
Our primary empirical specification compares trend di↵erences in mortality be-
tween the young-elderly who have been eligible for Medicare Part D for at least one
year (age 66) and the near-elderly who are not yet eligible (age 64), right around the
implementation of Medicare Part D. This follows a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach.
We use detailed cause-of-death mortality records for the entire population in the
United States between 2001-2008. We estimate that Medicare Part D reduced annual
mortality by 2.2 percent among the elderly in its initial years. This e↵ect is driven
primarily by a 4.4 percent reduction in cardiovascular mortality. The reductions in
mortality are largest for men and for non-whites. We find no e↵ect of Medicare Part
D on deaths due to cancer, a condition whose drug treatments are already covered
under Medicare Part B.
We observe mortality e↵ects beginning as early as 2005, one year before the full im-
plementation of the Part D program in 2006. We attribute this to Medicare Part D’s
2004-2005 Prescription Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance Programs.
These programs delivered $1.5 billion in subsidies to 1.9 million uninsured low-income
elderly individuals and provided substantial drug discounts to an additional 4.7 mil-
lion elderly. We support this interpretation by providing evidence that elderly drug
utilization increased considerably during 2004-2005 among the individuals most likely
to qualify for these transitional programs. More generally, we validate our mortality
results by demonstrating that the changes in drug utilization following the imple-
mentation of Medicare Part D closely match the mortality patterns we observe. For
instance, we find that utilization and expenditures among the young-elderly increased
by 25 to 30 percent for drugs treating diseases linked to cardiovascular mortality, but
did not change for cancer drugs. Finally, we calculate that the value of the mortal-
ity reduction is equal to $5 billion per year. Combining this social value with prior
studies evaluating its non-health benefits together yields a total benefit of about $20
billion per year.
In the third essay, “Driver Licensing Laws and Mortality: Evidence from a Regres-
sion Discontinuity Design,” we estimate the e↵ect of teenage driving laws on mortality.
Motor vehicle accidents, which are the leading cause of death for teenagers, kill more
than 30,000 people per year in the United States. Young drivers are particularly
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at risk because they lack driving experience and are more likely to get involved in
risky behaviors. As a result, all states require drivers to be above a certain minimum
age, and many states also have implemented Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) laws
starting in the mid-1990s that impose nighttime driving and passenger restrictions on
newly eligible drivers. While it is widely acknowledged among scholars that driving
eligibility increases mortality, the precise magnitude of this e↵ect is not well known.
Far less is known about whether recent driving restrictions reduce the likelihood of
motor vehicle fatalities. Our paper addresses this topic.
Identifying the causal e↵ect on mortality is especially challenging with driver
licensing laws because of confounding factors associated with eligible drivers being
older than ineligible drivers, and thereby making the comparison between these two
groups di cult. For example, eligible drivers may be more likely to die in motor
vehicle accidents for reasons that are unrelated to driving eligibility. We overcome
this obstacle by using a regression discontinuity design and exploiting the fact that
the minimum driving age creates stark di↵erences in the teenage driver population
on either side of the age cuto↵.
Within this framework, we compare death rates for teenagers just before and just
after reaching their state’s minimum driving age. We employ restricted-use mortality
data that include the universe of all deaths that occurred in the United States for the
years 1983-2014. This dataset contains information on the decedent’s cause of death,
state of residence, and month of birth. Preliminary results show that gaining driving
eligibility increases the total death rate by 8 per 100,000 population, or 15 percent,
with the e↵ects driven mainly by a sharp increase in the motor vehicle death rate.
We also investigate the e↵ectiveness of GDL laws using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences
regression discontinuity design, where we compare death rates for teenagers around
their state’s minimum driving age before and after the implementation of the laws.
Results show that nighttime driving and passenger restrictions reduced the total death
rate by 4 per 100,000, or 8 percent, among the teenage population.
In this dissertation, I evaluate how di↵erent types of policies and regulations car-
ried out by both the federal and the state governments a↵ect the well-being of citizens,
either directly or indirectly. With a better understanding of the cost-e↵ectiveness of
the existing programs, this dissertation serves as a guidance for policymakers in shap-
ing future policies and regulations to help improve people’s life expectancy and quality
of life.
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CHAPTER 2
MEDICAID AND PROVIDER SUPPLY
A major goal of expanding public health insurance is to increase people’s access to
health care. However, this goal presents a challenge if there are health care provider
shortages. For instance, one in five Americans currently lives in what the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) calls “primary care shortage areas,” where
the ratio of full-time primary care physician to population is typically less than one
physician per 3,500 individuals.1 Individuals living in these underserved areas may
face di culties in finding a provider or scheduling a timely appointment, even when
they are insured (Pathman, Ricketts, and Konrad 2006). Therefore, it is important
to understand how providers react to public health insurance expansions. Yet, little
is known about this topic.
This paper examines whether and to what extent providers’ practice locations
are a↵ected by Medicaid coverage expansions. I study adult dental care, one of the
most common forms of primary care services. Dentist shortages, which HHS defines
as having fewer than one full-time dentist per 5,000 individuals, are prevalent in the
United States as well, and they, too, pose significant barriers to access to services
(Kranz et al. 2014). In 2010, a total of 2,216 counties were designated as dentist
shortage areas, 674 of which had a shortage in the entire county and 1,542 of which
had a shortage in part of the county.2
Dental care is a class of services that are frequently a↵ected by Medicaid expan-
sions, and adult Medicaid dental benefits vary substantially from state to state and
year to year. Previous research has shown that adult Medicaid dental expansions
increase the potential customer base and income for dentists (Buchmueller, Miller,
and Vujicic 2014), and that financial incentives comprise an important determinant in
their location choices (Bolduc, Fortin, and Fournier 1996; Goetz and Debertin 1996).
This implies that the expansions should increase the supply of dentists in areas with
1See http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/hpsas/ for details of shortage designation criteria.
2A partial-county shortage means that not all census tracts within the county are designated as
shortage areas.
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large, pre-existing adult Medicaid populations. In theory, however, Medicaid could
crowd out more lucrative private insurance (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Gruber and
Simon 2008). Also, Medicaid incentives might not be large enough to impact location
decisions of dentists. Whether Medicaid expansions increase the supply of dentists in
practice is not known.
I employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences (DDD) approach to estimate the
e↵ect of Medicaid incentives on dentist supply by exploiting changes in adult Medicaid
dental benefits across states and over time, and in the size of potential Medicaid
populations. Using data on the universe of dentists during the time period 2006-2013,
I find that Medicaid expansions of dental coverage increased the supply of dentists
in poor counties relative to non-poor counties by 2.6 dentists per 100,000 population,
which corresponds to a 12 percent increase relative to their pre-expansion mean of
21 dentists.3 These e↵ects were concentrated among poor and densely populated
areas that had considerable exposure to the expansions. More generally, the impact
of Medicaid expansions on dentist supply exhibited heterogeneity by the size of the
change in financial incentives for dentists. There was no e↵ect of the observed increase
in dentist supply on being designated as a dentist shortage area.
The majority of the e↵ect is driven by private dentists. This finding is especially
policy relevant, because one of the original goals of the Medicaid program was to
encourage the private health care sector to treat low-income populations rather than
relying on public institutions such as community health centers (Davidson 1982; Fos-
sett, Peterson, and Ring 1989). By showing that Medicaid expansions significantly
attracted the supply of private practitioners to areas where Medicaid coverage was
prevalent, this paper shows that the expansions achieved one of the stated goals of
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the U.S. agency that administers these
programs.
This paper builds upon research on providers’ responsiveness to financial incen-
tives, such as loan forgiveness and scholarship programs, for practicing in underserved
areas. These incentive programs generally use provider shortage designations to iden-
tify underserved areas. Ba¨rnighausen and Bloom (2009) present a comprehensive
review of the literature. They conclude that while existing studies support the e↵ec-
tiveness of the programs in placing providers in underserved areas, causal inferences
3Following the Census Bureau’s definition, “poor” counties are defined as having poverty rates
of 20 percent or higher.
6
are weak because none of the studies fully controls for selection bias into the pro-
grams. In contrast, I examine Medicaid incentives that are not tied to shortage area
designations and show, using a rigorous empirical design, that providers responded
strongly to the incentives.
A large and growing body of literature on public health insurance expansions
has focused on the e↵ects on demand-side utilization. For example, prior studies
in this literature find that Medicaid expansions increased health insurance cover-
age rates and the use of health care services among Medicaid patients (Currie and
Gruber 1996; Busch and Duchovny 2005; Wang, Norton, and Rozier 2007; Currie,
Decker, and Lin 2008; Choi 2011; Decker and Lipton 2015). A few studies have ex-
amined how providers responded to Medicaid expansions. They find an increase in
provider participation, a modest change in the average number of hours spent on pa-
tients, and greater use of physician assistants or dental hygienists (Baker and Royalty
2000; Garthwaite 2012; Buchmueller, Miller, and Vujicic 2014). My paper contributes
to this literature by providing the first evidence that Medicaid expansions a↵ected
providers’ location decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 goes over the background informa-
tion and previous literature. Section 2.2 introduces a theoretical framework. Section
2.3 provides details of the data set and di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences identifi-
cation strategy. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the main results and robustness checks.
Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.1 Background and previous studies
2.1.1 Dental care and Medicaid dental benefits
Oral health a↵ects overall health and quality of life (Naito et al. 2006; de Oliveira,
Watt, and Hamer 2010). Poor dental health also influences individual productivity
and employment outcomes (Glied and Neidell 2010; Singhal, Correa, and Quin˜onez
2013). Despite the importance of the regular use of dental services, many individuals
do not seek dental care because of the high cost of services. For instance, one study
shows that 42 percent of non-elderly adults in the United States with a dental problem
did not visit a dentist because they could not a↵ord the price or did not have insurance
(Bloom et al. 2012).
7
Medicaid serves as the main source of dental coverage for low-income families and
individuals in the United States.4 While all states are required to provide comprehen-
sive dental coverage to children from low-income families, Medicaid dental coverage
to adults aged 19-64 is optional.5 For these non-elderly adults, there is substantial
variation across states and over time in terms of who is covered and which types
of dental services are covered under Medicaid, because the coverage is determined
at each state’s discretion. For instance, some states only cover medically necessary
emergency dental services, while other states cover a wide range of dental services.
So, too, some states may provide Medicaid dental coverage to parents or disabled
adults, but not to childless adults without disabilities.
The American Dental Association (ADA) defines four types of coverage: extensive,
limited, emergency, or none. Table 2.1 explains the details of these categories. Table
2.2 shows the variation in adult Medicaid dental coverage across states and over
time. Some states expanded and/or reduced adult Medicaid dental benefits, but
other states did not make any changes to their coverage levels during the period
2006-2013. Specifically, 12 states expanded and 5 states reduced benefits in 2011,
25 states had constant coverage levels during 2006-2013, and the remaining 8 states
changed benefits multiple times during this time period, or changed benefits before
or after 2011. Figure 2.1 illustrates these di↵erent groups of states.
2.1.2 Previous studies
Much of the literature on public health insurance expansions has focused on the e↵ects
on demand-side utilization. Few have studied the e↵ects on providers. Finkelstein
et al. (2012) find in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment that public health
insurance led to significantly higher utilization of primary and preventive health care
services as well as hospitalizations. Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2007) show that
health care utilization increased for the so-called “young elderly” at age 65 as they
became eligible for Medicare.
Substantial research on Medicaid expansions finds increased health insurance cov-
erage rates and use of health care services among Medicaid beneficiaries (Currie and
4Medicaid is currently the second largest source of health insurance in the United States
(Yarbrough, Vujicic, and Nasseh 2014).
5Dental benefits for low-income adults remain optional for states under the A↵ordable Care Act
(Nasseh, Vujicic, and O’Dell 2013).
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Gruber 1996; Busch and Duchovny 2005; Currie, Decker, and Lin 2008). Even in
the presence of a long-standing concern that low Medicaid reimbursement rates make
many health professionals reluctant to accept Medicaid patients, studies continue to
find significant e↵ects of Medicaid coverage on the patients. In recent work, Wherry
and Miller (2016) find that Medicaid expansions targeted at low-income adults as
part of the A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) were associated with improved quality of
their health insurance coverage and increased utilization of services.
Studies of dental coverage have examined the relationship between Medicaid dental
benefits and dental care service utilization. For instance, in an examination of the
relationship between dental insurance and preventive care utilization among adult
Medicaid beneficiaries, Choi (2011) finds that providing dental coverage increased
the likelihood of having any dental visit in the last 12 months. Similarly, Decker and
Lipton (2015) present evidence that pre-ACA Medicaid expansions of adult dental
coverage increased dental care use among low-income adults. Wang, Norton, and
Rozier (2007) find that the implementation of the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) in 1997 decreased the probability of unmet dental care needs among
children from low-income families.
These studies examining the e↵ects of Medicaid dental insurance on utilization
are closely related to research that delves into the e↵ects of dental coverage on hos-
pital emergency department (ED) visits for dental-related problems. The potentially
important value of preventive dental care has motivated researchers to focus on the
e↵ectiveness of preventive dental care utilization that was made possible through
Medicaid. Changes in ED visits are one way to measure the value of preventive den-
tal care. For example, Cohen et al. (2002) study changes in ED visits after Maryland
eliminated adult Medicaid dental benefits in 1993. They conclude that the elimina-
tion of dental coverage increased annual ED visits by non-elderly adults on Medicaid.
Similarly, Wallace et al. (2011) examine a natural experiment in Oregon where Med-
icaid dental coverage was dropped in 2003 for adults without disabilities. They find
that, as a result, the likelihood of using dental-related ED services rose among Medi-
caid enrollees whose dental benefits were eliminated. Again, all of these studies focus
on demand-side outcomes.
Far less is known about the e↵ect of expansions or contractions of public health
coverage on providers. Understanding how providers change their supply of services is
important because of the critical role this plays in giving access to and, thus, spurring
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utilization of services (Byck, Walton, and Cooksey 2002; Kranz et al. 2014). Baker
and Royalty (2000) investigate expanded Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women
during the 1980s and 1990s. They show that the expansion increased the fraction of
physician services provided to poor patients on Medicaid. Their results were driven
mostly by public practitioners, however, and the expansion did not have significant
impact on private practitioners. Garthwaite (2012) finds that the introduction of
SCHIP increased the percentage of private physicians taking any Medicaid patients,
accepting new Medicaid patients, and the amount of payments received through Med-
icaid. Garthwaite (2012) also finds that SCHIP was associated with a decrease in the
average number of hours spent with patients, reflecting shorter durations for visits
by Medicaid patients. Buchmueller, Miller, and Vujicic (2014) add to this by exam-
ining the e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental coverage expansions on various supply-side
outcomes for private dentists. They find that Medicaid expansions led to increased
dentist participation in the Medicaid program, higher total number of appointments
provided to Medicaid patients, and modestly more hours worked per week. Moreover,
they find that dentists’ income increased considerably as a result of these expansions.
Buchmueller, Miller, and Vujicic (2014) only look at changes in the supply of den-
tists on the intensive margin. However, capacity constraints limit how much dentists
can change on the intensive margin. The real growth in the supply of dental services
must come from the extensive margin as well. This makes it important to understand
the location choices of dentists in response to Medicaid dental expansions. I charac-
terize empirically how the supply of dentists was a↵ected on the extensive margin by
the expansions. Specifically, I address the question of whether and to what extent
Medicaid expansions created financial incentives to alter dentists’ location choices.
Moreover, my paper di↵ers from Buchmueller, Miller, and Vujicic (2014) in that I
estimate an expansion-induced change in access to services that is not limited to the
Medicaid population. Location decisions made by dentists determine the geographic
distribution of and general access to dental services.
2.2 A model of practice location choice
In this section, I set up a simple version of a discrete choice model (McFadden 1981;
Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse 1992; Train 2009) to describe the impact of adult
Medicaid dental expansions on dentists’ practice locations, the role of crowd-out of
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non-Medicaid coverage, and how the incentives di↵er based on the size of the Medicaid
population that depends on poverty levels and population density. Note that this is
not a full model, but an illustration of how Medicaid expansions may a↵ect dentist
supply.
The random utility of the representative dentist from choosing county i in period
t is Uit = uit+✏it 8 i, t, where uit represents the deterministic component of the utility
and ✏it is an idiosyncratic preference. Then, the probability of choosing county i over
n   2 alternatives in period t can be written as:
Pit = Prob(✏1t   ✏it  uit   u1t ^ ✏2t   ✏it  uit   u2t ^ ... ^ ✏nt   ✏it  uit   unt),
i = 1...n.
The deterministic component of the utility depends on consumer demand for den-
tal services among MedicaidDMit and non-Medicaid populationsD
NM
it , Medicaid reim-
bursement rates rMit , private insurance charges r
NM
it , and supply of dentists currently
in practice Sit. This relationship can be parsimoniously expressed as:
uit = r
M
it
DMit
Sit
+ rNMit
DNMit
Sit
+ (rMit
 DMit
Sit
+ rNMit
 DNMit
Sit
)1{i expands},
where 1{i expands} is an indicator function for a Medicaid expansion in the state in
which county i is located, and  DMit and  D
NM
it denote changes in the demand for
dental services in county i if there is an expansion in the state.6 The term (rMit
 DMit
Sit
+
rNMit
 DNMit
Sit
) captures Medicaid incentives. The larger this term is, the stronger the
financial reward to dentists provided by Medicaid expansions.
We are interested in these Medicaid incentives to locate or relocate, which will
a↵ect the number of dentists in county i in period t, Sit. Since the number of other
dentists in a county itself a↵ects expected profit from locating there, Sit will be
determined in equilibrium based on dentists’ choices. Specifically, we will require
that S⇤it satisfies:
S⇤it = PitNt, (2.1)
6The model can be set up similarly to explain how a reduction of adult Medicaid dental benefits
may a↵ect dentists’ practice locations.
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where Pit is also computed at S⇤it and Nt is the total number of dentists at the national
level in period t. The left-hand side of this equilibrium condition is the number of
dentists who are actually in county i in period t. The right-hand side is the number
of dentists who are expected to be there. The equilibrium condition is that they
are equal. Thus, we require that the number of dentists the representative dentist
expects to locate in a county equals the number of dentists who actually choose to
locate there in each period.
Let Soit be the initial number of dentists in each county before Medicaid expansions.
If there is an expansion in county i’s state, then this increases uit in the choice
probability expression for county i. The result is that the right-hand side of the
choice probability expression increases. Thus, the marginal dentist, who used to be
indi↵erent between expansion county i and alternative j, now prefers county i given
that the initial allocation of dentists to counties is set by Soit. More dentists move
into county i as a result. As the number of dentists who are actually in county i (i.e.,
the left-hand side of equilibrium condition (2.1)) increases, the additional incentive to
relocate to county i decreases, since the financial reward to locating in the expansion
county is now spread over more dentists. That is, the expected number of dentists
based on the choice probabilities after the expansion (i.e., the right-hand side of
equilibrium condition (2.1)) decreases. Therefore, the e↵ect of Medicaid incentives
on dentist supply ceases once county i has absorbed a certain number of additional
dentists. Eventually, equilibrium is restored at a higher number of dentists in county
i compared to its pre-expansion level.
In contrast, suppose county j is in a non-expansion state, but instead now other
states have expansions. Then, the right-hand side of the choice probability expression
for county j gets smaller, and fewer dentists would want to stay in county j. As they
exit, the actual number of dentists in the county (i.e., the left-hand side of equilibrium
condition (2.1)) decreases, and the expected number of dentists based on the choice
probabilities (i.e., the right-hand side of equilibrium condition (2.1)) increases. Again,
equilibrium is eventually restored with fewer dentists in county j. Overall, there are
more dentists in counties in the expansion states and fewer in counties in the non-
expansion states, when compared to the pre-expansion numbers. This directly leads
to the prediction below:
PREDICTION I Suppose county i is in an expansion state and county j is in a
non-expansion state. Then, the number of dentists in county i increases relative to
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county j, following an expansion of adult Medicaid dental benefits.
The literature has collectively shown that Medicaid expansions cause an increase
in the demand for services among the Medicaid population,  DMit > 0 (Wang, Norton,
and Rozier 2007; Choi 2011; Decker and Lipton 2015), but a decrease in the demand
among the non-Medicaid population,  DNMit < 0 (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Gruber
and Simon 2008; Garthwaite 2012). Then, the size of Medicaid incentives depends
positively on | DMit | and negatively on | DNMit |. In other words, uit and thus the
right-hand side of the choice probability expression for county i are increasing in
| DMit | and decreasing in | DNMit |. The following predictions are obtained based on
this relationship:
PREDICTION II Suppose county i is in an expansion state. Then, the increase in
the number of dentists in county i relative to alternative j depends positively on the
size of the increase in the demand for dental services among the Medicaid population
in county i.
PREDICTION III The increase in the number of dentists in county i relative to
alternative j depends negatively on the size of crowd-out of the demand for dental
services among the non-Medicaid population in county i.
PREDICTION IV The increase in the number of dentists in county i relative to
alternative j depends positively on the reimbursement rates of Medicaid in county i.
PREDICTION II suggests that the e↵ect of Medicaid incentives on dentist supply
should be concentrated in poor and densely populated counties in the expansion
states, because these counties experience the largest increase in the demand for ser-
vices from the Medicaid population. At the same time, low Medicaid reimbursement
rates may make dentists worried about Medicaid patients being unprofitable (i.e.,
rMit < r
NM
it ). Therefore, the e↵ect of an expansion on dentists’ practice locations is
unclear, especially if there is substantial crowd-out of non-Medicaid coverage (PRE-
DICTION III). On the other hand, this also means that the higher the Medicaid
reimbursement rates are relative to private-pay charges in expansion county i, the
larger the size of Medicaid incentives and the larger the increase in the number of
dentists in county i after the expansion (PREDICTION IV).
13
Dentists tend to stay in their current locations unless another alternative provides
a significantly higher profit. For example, practicing dentists would have to factor
in their current base of patients and personal or family situations before deciding
to relocate. In addition, dental licensure requirements are mostly set by each state
separately and any dentist who wishes to work in a state must obtain a license from
that state, thereby making it particularly costly for practicing dentists to move across
states. Thus, dentists have a stronger idiosyncratic benefit from the county where
they are currently located. Then, the following prediction can be derived:
PREDICTION V Suppose county i is in an expansion state. Then, the increase in
the number of dentists in county i relative to alternative j is least likely to come from
practicing dentists in county j.
PREDICTION V follows from ✏jt being higher for dentists currently in county j. In
other words, dentists have a stronger idiosyncratic benefit from the county where
they are currently located. This increases the left-hand side of the choice probability
expression for county i. Therefore, dentists in county j have a weaker preference for
county i, compared to new dentists or practicing dentists in county i. PREDICTION
V indicates that newly graduated dentists, or practicing dentists in county i who are
close to their retirement, should be more responsive to Medicaid incentives. The latter
group of dentists may respond to the incentives by changing the timing of retirement,
which would not require any relocation per se.7
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
2.3.1 Data
I use three main data sources. Information on dentists comes from the American
Dental Association’s (ADA) Dentist Masterfile for the years 2006-2013, which pro-
vides the yearly counts of all active dentists by county in the United States.8 Dentists
are grouped by dentist type (generalist or specialist) and practice type (private or
public).9 More importantly, the data provide dentist counts by year of graduation in
7Practicing dentists close to retirement would be comparing the utility from staying in county i
to the utility from retirement.
8This ADA data set does not distinguish between full-time and part-time dentists.
9General dentists and private dentists make up 87 percent and 92 percent of all dentists, respec-
tively, in the United States during the sample period.
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10-year brackets: before 1965, 1965-1974, 1975-1984, 1985-1994, 1995-2004, and after
2004. This graduation year information allows me to extend the subgroup analysis
by experience. I then obtain county-level covariates from the Area Health Resources
Files (AHRF). The AHRF is managed by the Health Resources and Services Adminis-
tration and contains county-level data from over 50 national sources. The county-level
variables of interest are the population size by race and age, population density, un-
employment rate, poverty rate, and per capita income.10 In addition, at the state
level, I obtain the uninsurance rate and variables of economic conditions from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics of the outcome variable and covariates for
12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental coverage in 2011, 5 states that reduced
coverage in 2011, and 25 states that kept constant coverage levels during 2006-2013.
The 12 expansion states and the 5 reduction states make up the treatment states, and
the other 25 states make up the control states. The Census Bureau defines “poor”
counties as having at least 20 percent of residents below the federal poverty level.
Following this definition, Table 2.3 reports the di↵erence in means between poor and
non-poor counties within the states, where poor counties have poverty rates of at
least 20 percent and non-poor counties have poverty rates of less than 20 percent.
On average, in both the treatment states and the control states, poor counties have
higher unemployment, lower income, a higher percentage of black residents in the
population, and fewer dentists than non-poor counties. The supply of other health
care providers such as primary care physicians is also lower in poor counties. These
observed di↵erences in some of the covariates, however, do not bias my estimates
because they are balanced with respect to the expansion or the reduction. This is
shown in columns (1a) and (2a) of Table 2.3 that report the p-values of coe cient
estimates on the interaction from regressions where each variable is regressed on
the treatment indicator, poverty indicator, and the interaction between these two
indicators.
Figure 2.2 presents aggregate trends in the number of dentists per capita by
poverty averaged across population density. The first panel of Figure 2.2 shows how
the supply of dentists in poor and non-poor counties changes over time in the ex-
pansion states in comparison to the control states. The second panel of Figure 2.2
10The population-density variable is constructed by dividing the non-elderly adult population by
the total land area for each county.
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compares the reduction states and the control states. Dentist counts per capita in-
crease over time in all subgroups of counties or states. A noticeable pattern is that
the di↵erence between the supply of dentists in poor and non-poor counties decreases
over time in the expansion states, relative to the control states. Trends in dentist
supply between the expansion and the control states remain largely parallel for non-
poor counties. On the other hand, poor counties in the expansion states gained a
substantial number of dentists in 2011-2013, and caught up with poor counties in the
control states. My analysis will estimate whether any of these observed patterns in
dentist supply can be attributed to the changes in adult Medicaid dental policies.
2.3.2 Empirical strategy
My empirical strategy exploits the variation in adult Medicaid dental benefits across
states and over time, and in the size of potential Medicaid populations. I use the
fact that those policy changes created larger demand shocks for dental care in poor
counties. Given the population density, poor counties on average have larger Medicaid
populations whose dental insurance benefits and therefore demand for dental care
services are much more likely to be a↵ected by Medicaid expansions or reductions.
Hence, I allow for di↵erential e↵ects of the policy changes on the location choices
of dentists between poor (poverty rate   20 percent) and non-poor (poverty rate <
20 percent) counties, using the Census Bureau’s definition of poverty areas. I follow
Gruber (1994) and Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) to construct a di↵erence-in-
di↵erences-in-di↵erences (DDD) estimate of the e↵ect of the changes in adult Medicaid
dental coverage. This model is based on the identifying assumption that the supply
of dentists in poor and non-poor counties would have evolved similarly in the absence
of the policy changes. I address this identifying assumption first by using a di↵erence-
in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences test of means and then more rigorously by an event-study
regression framework.
An alternative strategy is to use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) model, exploiting
the same source of variation across states and over time. However, states’ decisions to
expand or reduce Medicaid benefits may be endogenous. The decision may depend on
current economic conditions and forecasts, and, thus, states that expanded Medicaid
benefits may have done so because they expected improved budget situations. Then
dentists might have been attracted to the expansion states even in the absence of
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the expansions. The DDD approach addresses such a concern from the potential
confounding factors (Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo 2014). Even in the absence
of this endogeneity issue, the DD approach would not be ideal for my analysis because
it does not pick up responses to practice locations across counties within a state.
While the DDD model is my preferred specification, I discuss the DD approach and
its results in Appendix A.
Di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences analysis
Before delving into a regression framework, I first illustrate and validate the use of
the DDD approach. For the purpose of illustration, I restrict my sample to the 12
expansion states and the 25 control states. Table 2.4 provides a cross tabulation of
the mean supply of dentists per 100,000 population, based on the ADA’s Dentist
Masterfile for the years 2006-2013. Panel A shows the average per capita dentist
counts for the expansion states, and Panel B shows those numbers for the control
states. In each panel, I distinguish between periods before (2006-2010) and after
(2011-2013) the expansions, and also between poor and non-poor counties. During
the post-expansion period, the average number of dentists per 100,000 population in
poor and non-poor counties in the expansion states rose by 4.69 and 1.06 dentists,
respectively, when compared to the pre-expansion period. In other words, the supply
of dentists increased by 3.63 dentists in poor counties relative to non-poor counties.
This “within-treatment” di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimate of the e↵ect of the expan-
sions is statically significant. Again, the key identifying assumption is that trends in
the supply of dentists would have been similar in poor and non-poor counties in the
absence of the policy interventions. The common trends assumption can be examined
by comparing poor and non-poor counties in the control states. As shown in Panel B,
the average number of dentists per 100,000 population in poor and non-poor counties
in the control states increased by 1.73 and 2.03 dentists, respectively, after the expan-
sions. The “within-control” DD estimate is -0.30 and it is statistically insignificant,
thereby supporting the common trends assumption.11
By taking the di↵erence between Panels A and B, I obtain the DDD estimate of
the e↵ect of Medicaid expansions on the supply of dentists. The DDD estimate is
3.93 with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. I am di↵erencing out both
11In Appendix A, I repeat this exercise using primary care physicians, and I find both insignificant
“within-treatment” and “within-control” di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates.
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within-state and within-poverty time trends in this DDD estimate, and thus it is not
sensitive to either state-specific or poverty-specific shocks. The identifying assumption
that remains for my DDD analysis to be valid is that there was no contemporaneous,
unrelated shock that had di↵erential impacts on the supply of dentists in poor and
non-poor counties only in the expansion states. This is a reasonable condition to
be satisfied. For instance, the post-expansion period coincides with the time when
the United States began recovering from the Great Recession. Yet, even under the
possibility of di↵erential recovery rates in earnings between poor and non-poor coun-
ties, as suggested by Saez and Zucman (2015), there is no plausible explanation as to
how these di↵erential recovery rates could have been observed only in the expansion
states.12
Regression framework for di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences
I now move on to a regression framework with a full set of covariates and fixed e↵ects,
imposing additional structure on my DDD estimation. I first employ an event-study
model to capture heterogeneous treatment e↵ects of adult Medicaid dental coverage
over time before and after the policy changes occurred in 2011. I can test the parallel
trends assumption directly using this model. As explained previously, the treatment
states had constant dental coverage levels from 2006 to 2010 and then expanded
or reduced coverage in 2011.13 I exclude the remaining 8 states (plus the District of
Columbia) that made multiple changes to their coverage during 2006-2013, or changed
12I empirically test this potential threat to my identification strategy in Appendix A.
13There were 7 expansions from limited to extensive coverage, 1 from emergency to limited cover-
age, 1 from no coverage to limited coverage, and 3 from no coverage to emergency coverage. There
were 2 reductions from extensive to limited coverage, 2 from limited to emergency coverage, and 1
from emergency to no coverage. For now, I do not consider the extent of those changes. For instance,
I treat an expansion to extensive coverage the same as an expansion to emergency coverage.
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benefits before or after 2011.14 Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
Yct =  1Expansions +  2Povertyct +  3Expansions ⇤ Povertyct
+
2013X
t=2006,t 6=2010
 t1 ⇤ Expansions ⇤ 1(Y eart) +
2013X
t=2006,t 6=2010
 t2 ⇤ Povertyct ⇤ 1(Y eart)
+
2013X
t=2006,t 6=2010
 t3 ⇤ Expansions ⇤ Povertyct ⇤ 1(Y eart)
+Xct 1 + Zst 2 + ↵s ⇤ 1(States) +  t ⇤ 1(Y eart) + ✏ct (2.2)
The outcome variable is the log of the number of dentists per 100,000 population
in county c in year t. Poor counties (poverty rate   20 percent) are indicated by
Povertyct. The regressor Expansions represents the treatment group and it is equal
to 1 for the expansion states, -1 for the reduction states, and 0 otherwise.15 By
assigning a value of -1 to the reduction states, I combine the two treatment e↵ects in
a single regression and e↵ectively increase statistical power. At the same time, I am
implicitly making an assumption that the treatment e↵ect of a Medicaid expansion is
identical to that of a reduction except for having opposite signs. This is a reasonable
a priori restriction without having to know whether dentists respond any di↵erently
to an expansion than to a reduction. I also try relaxing the assumption, and testing
expansions and reductions separately in order to estimate any di↵ering e↵ects between
the two.
All two-way interactions between Expansions, Povertyct, and year fixed e↵ects
1(Y eart) are included. The coe cients of interest are the  t3’s on the three-way
interaction between these variables. The omitted year is 2010, the year before the
policy changes took place. Included in Xct are county-level covariates that may
a↵ect the supply of dentists. In particular, I control for the unemployment rate, per
capita income, percent of the population that is black, percent of the population
aged 19-64, and population density. I also control for time-varying state variables
Zst, namely, the state’s unemployment rate, per capita income, and percent of the
population without any health insurance among all age groups. The state fixed e↵ects
1(States) account for state characteristics that are time-invariant, and the year fixed
14Including these 8 states does not materially change my results, however.
15Note that Expansions will be absorbed by state fixed e↵ects and so there is no need to include
this separately when estimating the equation.
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e↵ects account for any changes in the supply of dentists that are common among all
states.16 Using quasi-experimental policy variation, this setup allows the comparison
of Medicaid-induced changes in the number of dentists between poor and non-poor
counties within the same states. Note that the variance of the outcome variable is
inversely correlated with the population size. Thus, regressions are weighted by the
square root of the county’s population to correct for heteroskedasticity of the outcome
variable (Ruhm 2000; Miller et al. 2009). Standard errors are clustered by state to
allow for serial correlation within states (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).17
I then constrain the  t3’s in equation (2.2) to be constant in the periods before
and after the changes in adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011. This is a reasonable
constraint as shown in Figure 2.3. I assign 2006-2010 as the pre-period, and 2011-2013
as the post-period. Again, I compare poor counties with non-poor counties in the
treatment states and examine the relative number of dentists per capita in these poor
counties in comparison to the control states. In particular, my estimating equation
becomes:
Yct =  1Expansions +  2Povertyct +  3Expansions ⇤ Povertyct
+  1Post11t ⇤ Expansions +  2Post11t ⇤ Povertyct
+  3Post11t ⇤ Expansions ⇤ Povertyct
+Xct 1 + Zst 2 + ↵s ⇤ 1(States) +  t ⇤ 1(Y eart) + ✏ct (2.3)
The variables are defined as in equation (2.2). The coe cient of interest is  3 on the
interaction Post11t⇤Expansions⇤Povertyct, where Post11t indicates the post-period
2011-2013.
Note that I do not seek to estimate general equilibrium e↵ects. This is in line
with Malani and Reif (2015) and other studies looking at the supply of health care
providers on the extensive margin. I focus primarily on the supply of dentists in
poor counties, whose residents are the main beneficiaries of Medicaid expansions,
relative to the supply in non-poor counties. Admittedly, dentists moving from one
16Alternatively, I can control for county fixed e↵ects instead of state fixed e↵ects. This does not
materially a↵ect my results. I include state fixed e↵ects to exploit the large within-state variation
in dentist supply. I report results using county fixed e↵ects in Appendix A.
17To address the problems associated with too few clusters (Cameron and Miller 2015), I provide
results in Appendix A using county-level clusters instead of state-level clusters, and they are nearly
identical.
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state to another or from one county to another within the same state may magnify
the relative di↵erences in dentist counts between states and counties. As I show
in the following section, however, the significance of my results is driven by newly
graduated dentists and existing dentists who might be delaying retirement, rather
than by dentists switching between states or counties.18
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main findings
In this section, I present results based on the empirical strategy laid out in Section 3.
Figure 2.3 plots estimates of the triple di↵erence coe cients from equation (2.2). In
this event-study framework, I show graphically how the supply of dentists evolves over
time between 2006 and 2013. The level of this figure is arbitrary, and I normalize the
estimates to the base year 2010, the year before Medicaid policy changes took place
in 2011. Figure 2.3 suggests that the number of dentists per capita in poor counties
relative to non-poor counties remains mostly constant during 2006-2010 and then
exhibits a stark increase during 2011-2013 in the treatment states, when compared to
the control states. This is a clear trend break and supports my identifying assumption
that the relative dentist counts in poor counties would have remained similar between
the treatment states and the control states in the absence of the policy changes. The
implied e↵ect based on the figure is that the supply of dentists in poor counties
increased by approximately 8 percent as a result of Medicaid expansions.
Figure 2.4 exhibits results from equation (2.2) separately by dentist type (gen-
eralist or specialist) and practice type (private or public practitioner). Recall that
general dentists and private dentists make up roughly 87 percent and 92 percent of all
dentists, respectively. Starting in 2011, the supply of both general and private den-
tists increases sharply in poor counties relative to non-poor counties in the treatment
states when compared to the control states. There is no evidence of pre-trends, and
both figures closely match the patterns observed in Figure 2.3 where all dentists were
pooled together. On the other hand, results for either dental specialists or public
practitioners are imprecise and exhibit pre-trends, and I refrain from drawing any
18My findings are consistent with Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) on tort reforms. They show
that the inflow of newly graduated residents and the outflow of retirees drive the changes in physician
counts as a result of tort reforms.
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conclusion on the e↵ects of the policy changes based on these event-study plots.
I next relax the assumption that the treatment e↵ect of a Medicaid expansion
is identical to that of a reduction, and provide estimates separately for the expan-
sions and reductions in Figure 2.5. The figure exhibits clear evidence that dentists’
responses to Medicaid policy changes are driven by the expansions, but not the re-
ductions. As visible in Figure 2.2, there were clearly more dentists in both poor and
non-poor counties of the reduction states than in the expansion states prior to the
2011 policy changes. Therefore, one possible explanation for the discrepancy between
the e↵ects of an expansion and a reduction is that the reductions states were losing
their attractiveness to newly graduated dentists, perhaps due to high competition.
Yet, existing dentists close to retirement, in particular, were not as responsive to the
reductions. In contrast, another possibility is that the reduction states were attractive
places for dentists regardless of the generosity of Medicaid dental coverage, and so
the impact of the benefit cuts was relatively small on their location-choice decisions.
Graphical evidence from Figures 2.3-2.5 is now evaluated using the regression
model with additional structure, equation (2.3). Table 2.5 reports results correspond-
ing to Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Column (2) of the table, where all county- and state-level
controls are included, shows that per capita dentists in poor counties relative to non-
poor counties increased by 8 percent as a result of the policy changes.19 This trans-
lates into 1.8 dentists per 100,000 population based on their pre-2011 mean. Columns
(3)-(6) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists and they generally support the
graphical evidence. Specifically, these results suggest that the changes in adult Med-
icaid dental coverage led to an increase in the relative supply of general and private
dentists in poor counties by 9 percent and 8 percent, respectively, or equivalently 1-2
dentists per 100,000 population based on their pre-expansion means.20 There is also
some evidence for significant e↵ects on the location choices of public dentists, but
not specialists. Specialists are in fact much less likely to practice in poor areas to
begin with (Rosenblatt and Hart 2000). During the pre-2011 period, for instance, the
average number of specialists in poor counties was just 2.2 per 100,000 population
whereas non-poor counties had 4.7 specialists per 100,000 in the 42 sample states.
I next extend the subgroup analysis by adding years of experience. I divide dentists
19The statistical significance of my results does not depend on the choice of control variables.
20Pre-2011 mean levels of private and general dentists were both about 20 dentists per 100,000
population.
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into those with at least 25 years, 5-25 years, and at most 5 years of experience (as
defined by the number of years after graduation from dental school) at the time of
the policy changes in 2011.21 Table 2.6 suggests that my results on dentist supply
are driven by dentists with either at least 25 years of experience or at most 5 years
of experience. These dentists together made up more than half (= 14 per 100,000)
of all dentists (= 22 per 100,000) in poor counties in the treatment states during
the pre-2011 period, and their supply increased by almost 2 dentists per 100,000
population as a result of Medicaid policy changes. I find no significant e↵ects on
mid-career dentists, however. This is consistent with the theoretical model described
in Section 2.2, predicting that the responses should be larger among dentists with
lower opportunity costs of moving. Discussions with dental professionals also support
the idea that mid-career dentists should be least responsive to the policy changes
because moving costs rise with tenure and make it di cult to relocate across counties
or states. Moreover, my findings are in line with Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005)
on tort reforms. They conclude that the inflow of newly graduated residents and the
outflow of retirees drove the changes in the number of physicians as a result of tort
reforms.
Finally, I examine adult Medicaid dental expansions and reductions separately.
Table 2.7 shows that the expansions increased the relative supply of dentists in poor
counties by 12 percent, or 2.6 dentists per 100,000 population. These e↵ects are
driven mainly by general and private dentists. On the other hand, the reductions in
benefits did not significantly a↵ect the location choices of dentists. I have provided
above two possibilities that may explain why I do not observe reduction-induced
changes in the supply. What the model in Section 2.2 further predicts is that the
impact of a Medicaid policy change on dentist supply should be small when the size
of crowd-out or crowd-in is large. My results are consistent with this prediction and
suggest that many Medicaid patients who had been using dental care services crowded
in, or continued seeing a dentist, after their coverage was reduced. In contrast, the
magnitude of crowd-out in the expansion states was relatively small with Medicaid
often being the only source of dental coverage for low-income adults.
21Dental specialists are required to complete a postgraduate training that typically lasts two to
four years including a residency.
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2.4.2 Heterogeneity by size of provider incentives
In this section, I restrict the sample to the 12 expansion states and the 25 control
states, and further estimate heterogeneous treatment e↵ects of the expansions by
various sources of financial incentives.22 First, Table 2.8 breaks down the analysis
by adult population density. The table shows that the e↵ects on dentist supply were
heavily concentrated in poor counties that had above-median density. Specifically,
per capita dentist counts in poor counties relative to non-poor counties with above-
median density increased by 16 percent, when compared to the control states. Based
on their pre-expansion mean of 28 dentists per 100,000 population, this translates
into more than 4 dentists per 100,000. Those poor and densely populated areas
experienced the greatest exposure to the expansions and mostly likely generated the
largest Medicaid incentives for dentists. Changes in dentist supply in poor counties
that had below-median density were minimal, however.
Dentists are eligible for loan forgiveness and scholarship programs if they practice
in areas designated as dental care Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs).23
Dentists can receive these benefits in addition to financial incentives created by adult
Medicaid dental expansions. Studies support the e↵ectiveness of such HPSA-tied
programs in placing providers in underserved areas, but their causal inferences are
usually weak (Ba¨rnighausen and Bloom 2009).24 In recent work, Laughery (2015)
studies the e↵ectiveness of primary care HPSA designation in recruiting physicians
to HPSAs and finds no significant e↵ects. I put this finding in the context of my
setting and examine whether HPSA-tied financial incentives combined with Medi-
caid expansions increased the supply of dentists more in dental care HPSAs than in
non-HPSAs. Table 2.9 reports estimates separately by this shortage designation. It
suggests that Medicaid expansions a↵ected the supply more in counties designated as
dental care HPSAs. The e↵ects on non-HPSAs were smaller, though I cannot reject
the hypothesis that non-HPSAs experienced an increase in dentist supply as much as
HPSAs did. I also explore the possibility of Medicaid expansions in alleviating dentist
22The reductions continue to have insignificant e↵ects on dentist supply and do not show hetero-
geneous treatment e↵ects by the size of provider incentives. I do not report those results.
23Dental care HPSAs are defined by the Department of Health and Human Services as geographic
areas where the ratio of full-time dentist to population is less than one dentist per 5,000 individuals.
24The federal government and more than 40 states currently o↵er loan repayment programs to
newly practicing dentists (American Dental Association 2014). These programs generally use HPSA
designations to identify underserved areas.
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shortages. In Table 2.10, I report estimates from equation (2.3) using dentist shortage
designations as the outcome variable. Two separate regressions are estimated using
the partial/whole county shortage indicator and the whole county shortage indica-
tor. Neither shows the e↵ects of the observed changes in dentist supply on removing
HPSA designations.
All else equal, an expansion by a state that provides high Medicaid reimbursements
for adult dental care services would generate greater financial incentives for dentists,
compared to an expansion by a state with low reimbursement rates. Using the total
Medicaid payments per beneficiary (including both children and adults) for dental
care services prior to the expansions, I divide the 12 expansion states into high- and
low-reimbursement states with 6 states in each group. Those per-beneficiary Medicaid
payments are used as a proxy for the reimbursement rates for adult dental services.
Table 2.11 shows that my results vary by the reimbursement rates. In particular, the
e↵ects were larger in states with high (above-median) reimbursement rates than in
states with low (below-median) rates.
Along with the reimbursement rates, the size of Medicaid incentives may also
depend on the extent of the expansions. From dentists’ perspective, the most lucrative
expansions are those involving extensive or limited coverage.25 Thus, I group the 12
expansion states into 7 states that expanded their adult Medicaid dental benefits from
limited to extensive coverage in 2011, 2 states that went from no coverage/emergency-
only coverage to limited coverage, and 3 states from no coverage to emergency-only
coverage. I provide results in Table 2.12. I find significant e↵ects on dentist supply
by the expansions to either extensive or limited coverage. Going from no coverage to
emergency-only coverage, however, had little or no e↵ect on the location choices of
dentists.
These findings reflect the size of the change in provider incentives and are consis-
tent with the predictions of the model that adult Medicaid dental expansions should
have larger e↵ects on dentist supply when the incentives are greater.
25Generosity of coverage greatly increases when going from no coverage/emergency-only coverage
to limited coverage, but substantial changes in services covered also occur when going from limited
to extensive coverage. For instance, extensive coverage always includes common dental procedures
such as periodontal and advanced restorative services (root canals and crowns), and some specialty
care like oral surgery services. Limited coverage excludes at least one of these main services.
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2.5 Robustness checks
In this section, I check the robustness of my findings for adult Medicaid dental ex-
pansions. I provide estimates based on a set of alternative specifications, for example,
where I use a continuous poverty rate variable instead of a binary measure, or use
dentist counts per 100,000 population as the outcome variable instead of the log of
the variable.26 The results are all consistent with those obtained using the main spec-
ification. In addition, I perform placebo exercises and rule out the possibility that
my results are driven by any contemporaneous, unrelated shock that was particular
to poor counties in the expansion states.
Continuous measure of poverty
In the main specification, I use a binary measure to divide counties into either a poor
or non-poor category. Using a binary measure o↵ers three major advantages. First, I
do not have to rely on the linear relationship between the poverty rate and the supply
of dentists. Second, using a binary measure is more robust to measurement errors
in the poverty rate variable. Last, it is easier to interpret. Nevertheless, I repeat
the DDD analysis using a continuous poverty measure, and provide results in Table
A.1. The average poverty rates among poor and non-poor counties during the sample
period were 25.31 percent and 13.36 percent, respectively. The table shows that
following Medicaid expansions in 2011, per capita dentists in counties with a 25.31
percent poverty rate relative to counties with a 13.36 percent poverty rate increased
by 4 percent or about 1 dentist per 100,000 in the expansion states. While smaller in
magnitude, results using the continuous poverty measure are consistent overall with
those obtained using the binary measure in the main text.
Dentists per capita
I now estimate equation (2.3) using dentists per 100,000 population as the outcome
variable instead of the log of the variable. With the log transformation, I essentially
assume that Medicaid expansions had constant percentage e↵ects on the supply of
dentists. This assumption is indeed appropriate in the context of my analysis because
there is heterogeneity of factors, both observed and unobserved, that has resulted in
26A complete set of robustness tests can be found in Appendix A.
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an uneven distribution of dentists across counties to begin with.27 Yet, for the sake
of completeness, I try relaxing this assumption. Table A.2 shows results using the
number of dentists per 100,000 as the dependent variable. The estimates suggest
that the expansions resulted in an increase of roughly 3 dentists per 100,000 in poor
counties relative to non-poor counties, when compared to the control states. The
e↵ects are again driven by generalists and private practitioners. While greater in
magnitude, these estimates are comparable to the results of my main DDD analysis.
Placebo exercise
I conduct a set of placebo exercises. I first repeat the main analysis using only the
pre-2011 period. Specifically, I restrict the sample years to 2006-2010, and select
alternative pre- and post-expansion years from this period. During 2006-2010, adult
Medicaid dental benefits stayed the same in both the expansion states and the control
states, and so I do not expect to observe significance from these placebo pairs. In
Table A.7, I present results for four di↵erent pre- and post-period pairs, and, indeed,
I do not find any significant e↵ects on the supply of dentists across all pairs.
As another placebo exercise, I use the supply of primary care physicians, instead of
dentists, as the outcome variable. All Medicaid coverage expansions examined in this
paper were targeted specifically at dental coverage. Therefore, I do not expect to find
any significant e↵ects of the expansions on physician supply. Regression estimates,
provided in column (1) of Table A.9, do not suggest any significant changes in the
relative supply of physicians in poor counties of the expansion states during 2011-
2013. This placebo exercise also can be used as a first pass to show that my main
results were not driven by macroeconomic shocks that may coincide with my sample
period.28
The major threat to my identification strategy is that poor counties in the expan-
27For instance, suppose that one county had 100 dentists per 100,000 residents and another county
had 10 dentists per 100,000 residents prior to Medicaid expansions. In this scenario, then, an
expansion that increased the number of dentists in either county by, say, 10 percent, added 10
dentists per 100,000 in the first county and 1 dentist per 100,000 in the latter one. This way, I take
into consideration the heterogeneity in their pre-expansion supply of dentists.
28As part of the A↵ordable Care Act, some states got a jump start on Medicaid eligibility expan-
sions for adults. My control states include two of these: Connecticut and Minnesota. Connecticut
expanded Medicaid eligibility e↵ective on April 1, 2010. Minnesota expanded Medicaid eligibility
first on March 1, 2010, followed by another eligibility expansion on August 1, 2011. Since they might
contaminate my placebo exercise, I repeated the exercise excluding the two states, and the results
were materially the same.
27
sion states could have experienced a contemporaneous, but unrelated improvement
in their economic conditions. For example, perhaps states chose to expand because
they were experiencing strong economic recoveries from the Great Recession and an-
ticipated favorable budget situations. This might have also brought dentists to the
expansion states and, in particular, to poorer areas where the recovery was more
robust, as suggested by Saez and Zucman (2015). To directly address this possibility,
I perform a placebo test to see if any concurrent, poor-county-specific, economic im-
provement occurred in the expansion states. Specifically, I put in variables related to
economic conditions as the dependent variable and estimate equation (2.3): county-
level unemployment rate and per capita income. Columns (2) and (3) of Table A.9
report results showing that there was no concurrent improvement in either of the two
economic indicators that was particular to poor counties in the expansion states.
Overall, these placebo exercises further add to the validity of my findings in the
main text.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper provides the first empirical evidence for the e↵ect of Medicaid expansions
on the location choices of providers. It is theoretically ambiguous whether and to
what extent the supply of providers may vary with the size of financial incentives cre-
ated by Medicaid expansions. I examine adult Medicaid dental benefit expansions,
and estimate that these expansions increased the number of dentists in poor coun-
ties relative to non-poor counties by 2.6 dentists per 100,000 population, or by 12
percent of their pre-expansion mean. My findings provide evidence that dentists did
respond to Medicaid incentives, and further analysis shows that they responded more
when the incentives were greater and opportunity costs were lower. My paper can
help policymakers understand not only how Medicaid expansions a↵ect the supply of
providers, but how providers respond to financial incentives in general.
Geographic disparities in access to health care services contribute to disparities
in overall health. To alleviate these disparities, the real growth in the supply of
providers must come from both the intensive and the extensive margin. Buchmueller,
Miller, and Vujicic (2014) find that the expansions of adult Medicaid dental coverage
increased the quantity of dental care services provided to Medicaid patients without
reducing the amount provided to patients with private insurance. They show that
28
dentists achieved this through greater use of dental hygienists and slightly increasing
the number of hours spent treating patients. I suggest another means through which
this may have been accomplished: the expansions led to more dentists per capita
available to treat more Medicaid patients without having to decrease their services
to other patients.
I find that adult Medicaid dental expansions attracted dentists mainly to poor
and densely populated counties where the size of the adult Medicaid population was
large. On one hand, this suggests that dentists’ location decisions were successfully
altered in such a way that they potentially helped improve access to services in poor
and densely populated areas. On the other hand, Medicaid expansions did not create
enough incentives for dentists to work in poor and sparsely populated areas where
the shortage problem is most acute. Yes, the incentives did work, but if the policy
goal is to recruit more dentists to poor and sparsely populated areas, this paper calls
for an alternative policy targeted specifically at these areas.
Locations with a small number of dentists currently in practice generally have
higher entry thresholds. This is another approach to explain why the expansions of
Medicaid dental coverage created significant e↵ects only on poor and densely popu-
lated counties with a large enough market size (Bresnahan and Reiss 1990; Bresnahan
and Reiss 1991). It would be interesting to study the impact of Medicaid expansions
in the context of entry thresholds in future research.
While I focus on the quantity of providers as the outcome of interest, it would be
worthwhile to estimate the impact on the quality of providers, especially those who
responded to Medicaid incentives. Moreover, further research is needed to explore how
both of these measures, quantity and quality, may change at the national level in the
long run. For example, the expansions of adult Medicaid dental benefits may a↵ect
the number and/or quality of students applying to dental schools. Understanding
these general equilibrium e↵ects is another important topic for future research.
29
2.7 Tables and figures
Table 2.1: Definitions of adult Medicaid dental coverage
None No#dental#benefits
Extensive
A#more#comprehensive#mix#of#services,#including#many#diagnostic,#
preventive,#and#minor#and#major#restorative#procedures.#It#includes#
benefits#that#have#a#per=person#annual#expenditure#cap#of#at#least#$1,000.#
It#includes#benefits#that#cover#at#least#100#procedures#out#of#the#
approximately#600#recognized#procedures#per#the#ADA’s#Code#on#Dental#
Procedures#and#Nomenclature.
Limited
A#limited#mix#of#services,#including#some#diagnostic,#preventive,#and#minor#
restorative#procedures.#It#includes#benefits#that#have#a#per=person#annual#
expenditure#cap#of#$1,000#or#less.#It#includes#benefits#that#cover#less#than#
100#procedures#out#of#the#approximately#600#recognized#procedures#per#
the#ADA’s#Code#on#Dental#Procedures#and#Nomenclature.
Emergency Relief#of#pain#and#infection.##While#many#services#might#be#available,#care#may#only#be#delivered#under#defined#emergency#situations.
Source: American Dental Association.
Table 2.2: Adult Medicaid dental benefits by state and year, 2006-2013
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Alaska Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
Colorado None None None None None Em Em Em
Iowa Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
Missouri None None None None None Em Em Em
New@Mexico Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
North@Carolina Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
Ohio Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
Oregon Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
Rhode@Island Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Ex Ex Ex
Texas None None None None None Em Em Em
Virginia None None None None None Lm Lm Lm
Wyoming Em Em Em Em Em Lm Lm Lm
Illinois Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Em Em Em
Montana Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Em Em Em
New@Jersey Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Lm Lm Lm
Pennsylvania Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Lm Lm Lm
Tennessee Em Em Em Em Em None None None
States&with&an&expansion
States&with&a&reduction
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Table 2.2: (Continued) Adult Medicaid dental benefits by state and year, 2006-2013
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Alabama None None None None None None None None
Connecticut Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
Delaware None None None None None None None None
Florida Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Georgia Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Idaho Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
Indiana Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Kansas Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Kentucky Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Louisiana Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Maine Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
Maryland Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Massachusetts Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Minnesota Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Mississippi Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
Nebraska Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
Nevada Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
NewKHampshire Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
NewKYork Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
NorthKDakota Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
Oklahoma Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
SouthKCarolina Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
Vermont Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
WestKVirginia Em Em Em Em Em Em Em Em
Wisconsin Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
Arizona Em Em Em Em None Em Em Em
Arkansas None None Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm Lm
California Ex Ex Ex Ex None Em Em Em
Hawaii Em Lm Lm Lm Lm Em Em Em
Michigan Ex Ex Ex Em Ex Lm Lm Lm
SouthKDakota Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Lm Lm
Utah Lm Lm Lm None None Em Em Em
Washington Lm Ex Ex Ex Ex Em Em Em
States&with&no&change&in&benefits
Excluded&states
Notes: This table shows adult Medicaid dental benefits by state and year during 2006-2013, grouped
by the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced
benefits in 2011, the 25 states that had constant coverage levels during 2006-2013, and the remaining
8 states that made multiple changes to their coverage levels during 2006-2013, or changed benefits
before or after 2011. “Ex” denotes extensive coverage, “Lm” limited coverage, “Em” emergency
coverage only, and “None” no coverage. See Table 2.1 for details of di↵erent coverage types. Source:
American Dental Association.
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Table 2.4: Cross tabulation of the average number of dentists per 100,000 population
Period Poverty*rate*<*20% Poverty*rate*≥*20% Difference*by*poverty
Pre7expansion*period*(200672010) 34.64 21.01 713.63
(0.35) (0.50) (0.65)
[3,809] [923] [4,732]
Post7expansion*period*(201172013) 35.70 25.70 710.00
(0.53) (0.68) (0.84)
[2,050] [803] [2,853]
Difference*by*time 1.06 4.69 3.63
(0.67) (0.82) (1.01)
[5,859] [1,726] [7,585]
Pre7expansion*period*(200672010) 37.34 24.33 713.02
(1.41) (1.07) (1.54)
[5,486] [1,762] [7,248]
Post7expansion*period*(201172013) 39.37 26.06 713.32
(1.47) (1.07) (1.77)
[2,972] [1,381] [4,353]
Difference*by*time 2.03 1.73 70.30
(0.50) (0.43) (0.80)
[8,458] [3,143] [11,601]
DDD*Estimate 3.93
(1.39)
[19,186]
Panel&A.&Treatment&states&with&Medicaid&coverage&expansions
Panel&B.&Control&states&with&no&change&in&Medicaid&coverage
Notes: This table shows the average number of dentists per 100,000 population using the American
Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Each cell
corresponds to the identified subset of the sample. Panel A contains the 12 treatment states that
expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011. Panel B contains the 25 control states that did
not change dental benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by
state, and sample sizes are given in square brackets. In Panel A, a bootstrap procedure is applied
as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), using 500 bootstrap resamples.
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Table 2.6: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of changes in adult Medicaid dental coverage
on the supply of dentists, by years of experience
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.12 *** 0.05 0.14 **
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 80.01 0.04 80.06
(0.03) (0.08) (0.13)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 80.03 *** 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.10 *** 0.07 * 80.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
(Poverty) 80.15 *** 80.23 *** 80.09
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
State?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes
Year?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes
County8level?controls Yes Yes Yes
State8level?controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,914 21,914 21,914
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
Years'since'graduation
At'least'25'years 5'to'25'years At'most'5'years
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) by years of experience using the
American Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013.
The eldest [mid-career, youngest ] cohort includes dentists who graduated from dental schools before
1985 [between 1985 and 2004, after 2004 ] with at least 25 years [5-25 years, at most 5 years] of
experience at the time of the policy changes. Each column corresponds to a separate regression.
The sample includes 42 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011,
the 5 states that reduced benefits in 2011, and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits
during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are
weighted by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at
5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
35
Table 2.7: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of changes in adult Medicaid dental coverage
on the supply of dentists, expansion or reduction
Expansion)Effect)(+expansion) 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08)
Reduction)Effect)(=expansion) 0.00 =0.01 =0.01 0.00 =0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
State)fixed)effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year)fixed)effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County=level)controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State=level)controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,914 21,914 21,914 21,914 21,914
Coefficient)on)(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty)
Full)Sample Dentist)Type Practice)Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental As-
sociation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The expansion and
reduction e↵ects are estimated separately. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups of
dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 42 states: the 12
states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits in
2011, and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the
county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1
percent.
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Table 2.8: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, by population density
Above&median,Density 0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.06 0.15 *** 0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10)
Below&median,Density 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.08
(0.09) (0.07) (0.21) (0.08) (0.16)
State,fixed,effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year,fixed,effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County&level,controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State&level,controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
Coefficient)on)(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty)
Full)Sample Dentist)Type Practice)Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) interacted with adult population
density using the American Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files
for 2006-2013. Counties are divided into above- and below-median density categories. Columns (2)-
(5) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column and row corresponds to a separate
regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental
benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard
errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square root of
the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1
percent.
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Table 2.9: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, by HPSA designation
HPSA 0.13 *** 0.14 *** 0.06 0.12 *** 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09)
Non4HPSA 0.08 0.10 *** 40.14 0.07 40.11
(0.06) (0.03) (0.34) (0.06) (0.23)
State:fixed:effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year:fixed:effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County4level:controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State4level:controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
Coefficient)on)(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty)
Full)Sample Dentist)Type Practice)Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) interacted with dental care HPSA
indicator using the American Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources
Files for 2006-2013. Counties are divided into partial/whole county HPSA and no shortage cate-
gories. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column corresponds to
a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid
dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013.
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square
root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant
at 1 percent.
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Table 2.10: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on
dentist shortage designation
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 30.05 30.02
(0.05) (0.06)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.15 *** 0.03
(0.05) (0.09)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 30.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.02 30.06
(0.03) (0.04)
(Poverty) 30.04 0.07 *
(0.03) (0.03)
State>fixed>effects Yes Yes
Year>fixed>effects Yes Yes
County3level>controls Yes Yes
State3level>controls Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186
Shortage'designation
Partial/whole'
county'HPSA
Whole'county'
HPSA
(1) (2)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Alternative outcomes
are estimated: partial/whole county shortage indicator and whole county shortage indicator. Each
column corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that
expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to
benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions
are weighted by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant
at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 2.11: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, by reimbursement rates
High%Reimbursement%Rates 0.14 *** 0.16 *** 0.02 0.13 *** 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
Low%Reimbursement%Rates 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 @0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.15) (0.07) (0.10)
State%fixed%effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year%fixed%effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County@level%controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State@level%controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
Coefficient)on)(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty)
Full)Sample Dentist)Type Practice)Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The expansion e↵ects
are estimated separately for states with above- and below-median Medicaid reimbursement rates for
dental services. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column corre-
sponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult
Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during
2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted
by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 2.12: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, by expansion type
Limited'to'Extensive 0.15 ** 0.14 *** 0.16 0.15 ** 0.12
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16)
None'or'Emergency'to'Limited 0.16 *** 0.18 *** 0.01 0.15 *** 0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.08)
None'to'Emergency 0.03 0.01 0.10 * ?0.01 0.10
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11)
State'fixed'effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year'fixed'effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County?level'controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State?level'controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
Coefficient)on)(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty)
Full)Sample Dentist)Type Practice)Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental As-
sociation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Three types of ex-
pansions are estimated separately: 7 expansions from limited to extensive coverage, 2 from no
coverage/emergency-only coverage to limited coverage, and 3 from no coverage to emergency cov-
erage. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column corresponds to
a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid
dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013.
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square
root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant
at 1 percent.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of changes in adult Medicaid dental policies, 2006-2013
Notes: This map displays the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5
states that reduced benefits in 2011, the 25 states that had constant coverage levels during 2006-2013,
and the remaining 8 states that made multiple changes to their coverage levels during 2006-2013, or
changed benefits before or after 2011. Source: American Dental Association.
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Figure 2.2: Mean supply of dentists by poverty, 2006-2013
(a) Expansion and Control States
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the average dentist counts per 100,000 in poor and non-poor counties in the
12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and in the 25 states that maintained
constant coverage levels during 2006-2013. Panel (b) shows the average dentist counts in poor and
non-poor counties in the 5 states that reduced benefits in 2011 and in the 25 control states. A county
is defined as a poor county if its poverty rate is at least 20 percent. The vertical line indicates 2010,
the year before Medicaid policy changes occurred. Source: American Dental Association’s Dentist
Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013.
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Figure 2.3: Event-study plot of the triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of changes in adult
Medicaid dental coverage on the supply of dentists, expansion and reduction combined
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Notes: This figure shows estimates of the coe cient on the three-way interaction between
Expansions, Povertyct, and year fixed e↵ects from equation (2.2) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The sample includes 42
states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced
benefits in 2011, and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. The
vertical line indicates 2010, the year before Medicaid policy changes occurred. Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by state and regression is weighted by the square
root of the county population.
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Figure 2.4: Event-study plot of the triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of changes in adult
Medicaid dental coverage on the supply of dentists, by dentist type and practice type
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(b) Specialist
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(c) Private
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(d) Public
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Notes: Panels show estimates of the coe cient on the three-way interaction between Expansions,
Povertyct, and year fixed e↵ects from equation (2.2) using the American Dental Association’s Dentist
Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Panels (a) and (b) show the results by
dentist type. Panels (c) and (d) show the results by practice type. The sample includes 42 states:
the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits
in 2011, and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. The vertical line
indicates 2010, the year before Medicaid policy changes occurred. Bands indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the
county population.
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Figure 2.5: Event-study plot of the triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of changes in adult
Medicaid dental coverage on the supply of dentists, expansion or reduction
(a) Expansion
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(b) Reduction
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Notes: Panels show estimates of the coe cient on the three-way interaction between Expansions,
Povertyct, and year fixed e↵ects from equation (2.2) using the American Dental Association’s Dentist
Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The expansion and reduction e↵ects are
estimated separately. The sample includes 42 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid
dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits in 2011, and the 25 states that did not
make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. The vertical line indicates 2010, the year before Medicaid
policy changes occurred. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by
state. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the county population.
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CHAPTER 3
DID MEDICARE PART D REDUCE MORTAL-
ITY?
A major reason to provide public health insurance is its potential to increase an
individual’s life expectancy and improve her quality of life. This is supported by
basic economic theory, which suggests that a reduction in the price of medical care
should increase an individual’s stock of health (Grossman 1972). Indeed, improving
people’s health was a primary motivation behind the enactment of social insurance
programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the A↵ordable Care Act.
Although it is well documented that these social insurance programs increase
health care utilization, many studies indicate that they provide, at best, only limited
health benefits for adults.1 If true, these programs may primarily increase the use of
ine↵ective medical care. Although there is evidence that these programs still deliver
significant insurance value to beneficiaries (Engelhardt and Gruber 2011; Finkelstein
and McKnight 2008), the lack of major health benefits limits their cost-e↵ectiveness.
We investigate the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on elderly mortality. This prescrip-
tion drug insurance program currently serves 39 million Medicare beneficiaries and
spends $70 billion ($1,800 per beneficiary) per year (Medicare Board of Trustees
2014). Prescription drugs represent an increasingly valuable source of health care,
with over ninety percent of the elderly consuming prescription drugs at least once per
month (NCHS 2014). The introduction of Part D is an excellent natural experiment
for detecting the e↵ects of prescription drug insurance on health because it drastically
increased coverage rates for the elderly. Between 2004 and 2007, about one-fourth of
the elderly population gained prescription drug insurance (Kaestner and Khan 2012).
Our primary empirical specification compares trend di↵erences in mortality be-
tween the young-elderly who have been eligible for Medicare Part D for at least one
This is joint work with Julian Reif.
1Baicker et al. (2013), Finkelstein and McKnight (2008), and Kaestner, Long, and Alexander
(2014) find no or very limited e↵ects of health insurance on health. Two notable exceptions are
Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) and Sommers, Long, and Baicker (2014).
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year (age 66) and the near-elderly who are not yet eligible (age 64), right around the
implementation of Medicare Part D.2 We employ detailed cause-of-death mortality
records for the entire U.S. population, which allows us to measure mortality, a rela-
tively rare event, very precisely. We estimate that Medicare Part D reduced annual
mortality by 2.2 percent (0.036 percentage points) among the elderly in its initial
years. This e↵ect is driven primarily by a 4.4 percent reduction in cardiovascular
mortality. We find no e↵ect of Medicare Part D on deaths due to cancer, a condition
whose drug treatments are covered under Medicare Part B. The e↵ects are largest for
men and for non-whites. We show in the main text and in an extensive appendix that
our results are robust to using a variety of di↵erent specifications and are not driven
by di↵erential pre-existing trends in mortality between the control and treatment
groups. Placebo exercises confirm that the mortality rate of individuals just under
the age of 65, who are generally ineligible for Medicare, was una↵ected by Medicare
Part D.
We find mortality e↵ects beginning as early as 2005, one year prior to the full
implementation of Part D. We attribute this to Medicare Part D’s 2004-2005 Pre-
scription Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance Programs, which delivered
$1.5 billion in subsidies to 1.9 million uninsured low-income elderly and granted large
drug discounts to an additional 4.7 million elderly. We support this interpretation
by providing evidence that elderly drug utilization increased during 2004-2005 among
the individuals most likely to qualify for these programs.
Our empirical design yields intent-to-treat estimates of gaining drug insurance
eligibility on mortality. If we attribute our estimated mortality e↵ect entirely to pre-
viously uninsured individuals who gained drug coverage during our sample period,
then this implies that prescription drug insurance reduces annual mortality by 9.6
percent, or 0.16 percentage points. To put both this estimate and our intent-to-treat
estimate in context, we compare them to other studies estimating the e↵ect of health
insurance on mortality. Our estimates are of course larger than those from stud-
ies that find no statistically significant e↵ect of health insurance on adult mortality
(Finkelstein and McKnight 2008; Kaestner, Long, and Alexander 2014), although
they are within the bounds of their 95 percent confidence intervals. Our estimates
are smaller in magnitude than those from other studies that do find a statistically sig-
nificant e↵ect (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Sommers, Long, and Baicker 2014).
2Our results are robust to using di↵erent age ranges for the treatment and control groups.
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This is sensible because these other studies examine health insurance programs that
include hospital and outpatient benefits as well as, in some cases, prescription drug
benefits.
We examine drug utilization data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
to validate our findings. Consistent with our mortality analysis, we estimate that
utilization and expenditures among the young-elderly increased by 25 to 30 percent
for drugs treating diseases linked to cardiovascular mortality, but did not change for
cancer drugs, which are covered primarily by Medicare Part B. This increase was
exhibited by nearly all demographic groups, and was 45 percent larger for non-whites
than for whites. Importantly, we present evidence that drug utilization increased
beginning in 2004 for the low-income individuals targeted by the 2004-2005 Pre-
scription Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance Programs. Overall, the
observed changes in drug utilization patterns during this time period are consistent
with the changing patterns in mortality.
Finally, we calculate that the social value of the reduction in elderly mortality
attributable to Medicare Part D is worth about $5 billion per year. Combining this
result with prior studies evaluating its non-health benefits yields a total benefit of
about $20 billion per year. This total does not account for other potential benefits of
the Part D program, such as a reduction in morbidity, but nevertheless still represents
a sizeable fraction of its total expenditures.
Whether health insurance improves health is a longstanding question in health eco-
nomics. Prior work showing that health insurance reduces adult mortality has been
limited either to a specific population such as sick individuals admitted to hospital
emergency departments (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009) or to a specific geographic
area like Massachusetts (Sommers, Long, and Baicker 2014). Our paper advances this
literature by providing additional evidence, derived from a strong empirical design
coupled with detailed administrative data, that the public provision of health insur-
ance can have a significant nationwide impact on total mortality.
We also contribute to the growing literature on Medicare Part D. Prior studies
have documented that Part D increased elderly drug insurance coverage and drug
utilization (Engelhardt and Gruber 2011; Kaestner and Khan 2012). Little is known
about the health benefits of this program, however. We provide the first evidence
that the increase in drug utilization attributable to Medicare Part D saved lives.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
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information on related literature and the Medicare Part D drug insurance program.
Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 presents our main mortality results. Section
5 presents an analysis of the e↵ect of Part D on drug use. Section 6 provides a cost-
benefit analysis and Section 7 concludes.
3.1 Background and previous studies
3.1.1 Medicare Part D and prescription drug insurance
Medicare Part D is a prescription drug benefit program for seniors that was enacted as
part of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. The MMA also established
the Prescription Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance Programs to provide
relief from the high costs of prescription drugs to Medicare beneficiaries prior to the
full implementation of Medicare Part D. These two programs began in June 2004 and
remained in operation until 2006.3
All Medicare beneficiaries, except for those with pre-existing Medicaid drug cov-
erage, were eligible for the Prescription Drug Discount Card Program. The cards
were o↵ered by approved sponsors, usually established pharmacy benefit managers,
who used their large membership numbers to negotiate discounted prices with drug
manufacturers. The sponsors were allowed to charge an annual enrollment fee of up
to $30 to cardholders. The discounts were substantial: the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services estimates that these cards delivered discounts of 12 to 21 percent
for brand name drugs, and 45 to 75 percent for generic drugs (Hassol 2006). Between
May 2004 and August 2005, the Drug Discount Card Program enrolled 6.6 million
Medicare beneficiaries (16 percent of the Medicare population). Enrollment occurred
quickly and the program was popular: more than half of all enrollees had entered the
program by November 2004, and a 2005 survey of over 10,000 card members found
that 69 percent reported using their discount cards “every time”.4
The Transitional Assistance Program provided subsidies of up to $1,200 to low-
3These two temporary programs are considered part of Medicare Part D (Medicare Board of
Trustees 2004), but in this paper we will often mention them separately from the later (and larger)
implementation of Part D because it is common in the literature to use January 1, 2006 as the
“o cial” start date of Medicare Part D.
4Respondents receiving transitional assistance (subsidies) were even more likely (78 percent) to
use their cards “every time” (Hassol 2006). The main reason for not using the card was that the
respondents had no prescriptions to fill.
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income individuals who lacked access to prescription drug coverage when they signed
up for drug discount cards.5 These subsidies were administered in a manner similar to
a debit card, with the amounts applied as credits to the drug discount card. During
2004-2005, 1.9 million qualifying individuals received a total of $1.5 billion in subsidies
(Medicare Board of Trustees 2014). Drug discount card members, especially those
receiving subsidies, were more likely to be non-white than beneficiaries not enrolled
in these programs (Hassol 2006).
The rest of Medicare Part D began on January 1, 2006. Anybody eligible for
traditional Medicare is eligible for Medicare Part D. This includes all individuals
over the age of 65 who have worked for ten or more years in covered employment.
Enrollment in Part D is voluntary, although individuals who delay enrollment must
pay a small penalty that rises with the length of delay. Low-income individuals who
qualify for both Medicaid and Medicare (“dual eligibles”) are automatically enrolled
into Part D. The program signed up 28 million members in 2006, its first year, and
grew to 39 million members by 2013.6
Medicare beneficiaries can obtain prescription drug coverage under Part D by
joining a standalone Medicare Prescription Drug Plan, which o↵ers only prescrip-
tion drug benefits, or through Medicare Advantage, a managed care alternative to
traditional government Medicare that uses private firms to provide insurance. Alter-
natively, beneficiaries can receive coverage through their employer, so long as it is
su ciently generous.
Beneficiaries select from among a number of di↵erent Part D plans. Although the
plans may di↵er with respect to premiums, deductibles, and copays, each must be
actuarially equivalent to, or more generous than, the standard benefit established by
Congress. In 2006, the program’s first year, this standard benefit design included a
monthly premium of $32.20, a $250 deductible, and a coinsurance rate that begins at
25%, rises to 100% after an initial benefit limit (the “donut hole”), and then falls to
5% once the beneficiary has incurred $3,600 in out-of-pocket expenditures (Medicare
Board of Trustees 2014). Low-income individuals are eligible for subsidies that defray
5The income threshold for obtaining access to the subsidy was set at 135% of the federal poverty
line. The MMA specifically excludes low-income individuals with access to other sources of drug
coverage from the subsidies. See http://www.ssa.gov/OP Home/ssact/title18/1860D-31.htm for de-
tails.
6Medicare’s total enrollment, which includes members who elected not to sign up for Part D, was
52 million in 2013.
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some of these costs.
Medicare Part D expenditures totaled $47 billion in its first year. Expenditures
were $70 billion in 2013 and are expected to increase to more than $170 billion
annually by 2023 (Medicare Board of Trustees 2014). For comparison, the gross costs
of the A↵ordable Care Act’s coverage provisions are estimated to be $38 billion in
2014 and to rise to $227 billion by 2023 (Congressional Budget O ce 2014).
About two-thirds of Medicare beneficiaries already had access to some form of
prescription drug insurance prior to 2006. Kaestner and Khan (2012) estimate that
Medicare Part D increased this coverage rate to about 90 percent. The majority of
this increase occurred among individuals who were relatively poor and low educated.
Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) and Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) show that Medi-
care Part D also significantly crowded out other sources of insurance coverage. This
means that Medicare Part D could have an impact on utilization and health not only
through a reduction in the number of the uninsured, but also through a change in
the composition of prescription drug coverage.
3.1.2 Prior studies
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The first examines the e↵ect of
health insurance on health. The second examines the e↵ect of the Medicare Part D
prescription drug insurance program on utilization and spending.
E↵ect of health insurance on health
In their comprehensive review of the literature, Levy and Meltzer (2004) conclude that
health insurance strongly benefits the health of vulnerable populations such as infants,
but caution that the benefits for other populations may be quite modest. For example,
the RAND health insurance experiment finds that increasing the generosity of health
insurance improved the health status of persons with high blood pressure, but had
no significant e↵ect on the health status of the average patient (Brook et al. 1983).
Lurie et al. (1984) find that the termination of MediCal benefits increased blood
pressure among a group of low-income patients at the UCLA hospital. Bhattacharya,
Goldman, and Sood (2003) estimate that health insurance improves the health status
of HIV positive patients. It is worth noting that each of these health improvements
are for illnesses that can be treated with prescription drugs.
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Several studies have examined the e↵ect of Medicare on mortality. Lichtenberg
(2002) employs death probability data to estimate the e↵ect of Medicare on mortality
and finds that Medicare increases the survival rate of the elderly who are older than
65. In more recent work, Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) examine the e↵ect of
the 1965 introduction of Medicare on elderly mortality. They employ two di↵erent
empirical designs, one that exploits variation in age-eligibility (similar to this paper)
and another that exploits geographic variation in pre-existing insurance coverage. In
neither case do they detect any significant e↵ects on mortality.
Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) also examine Medicare, but focus their analysis
on elderly patients admitted to emergency departments with non-deferrable condi-
tions. They estimate the e↵ect of Medicare on mortality using the Medicare eligibil-
ity age in a regression discontinuity design. They find that Medicare reduced annual
mortality by 4.3 percent in their patient population.
Sommers, Long, and Baicker (2014) investigate the e↵ect of the 2006 Massachusetts
health care reform, which expanded health care insurance to non-elderly adults, on
mortality. They compare mortality trends in Massachusetts counties to mortality
trends in a control set of counties with similar demographics and economic conditions
and estimate that the reform decreased total mortality by 2.9 percent.
The best available recent evidence comes from the Oregon Health Insurance Ex-
periment, a randomized controlled trial of Medicaid in 2008 (Baicker et al. 2013).
The researchers find a significant e↵ect of insurance coverage on the use of preventive
services, but no e↵ect on the prevalence of hypertension, high cholesterol levels, and
several other basic indicators of health. Although the empirical design of this study is
excellent, its sample size of approximately 12,000 limits its ability to detect changes
in health outcomes that are rare in the short run, such as mortality.
E↵ects of Medicare Part D
The majority of studies examining Medicare Part D have focused on its e↵ects on
drug utilization and out-of-pocket spending. Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) examine pre-
scription drug data from Walgreens during the time period September 2004 through
December 2006. They employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erences research design that com-
pares the elderly to the non-elderly before and after the implementation of Medicare
Part D, and conclude that the introduction of Medicare Part D was associated with
a 13 percent increase in elderly prescription drug use and an 18 percent reduction in
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out-of-pocket drug spending.
Schneeweiss et al. (2009) analyze data on prescription drug purchases at three
pharmacy chains that operated in multiple states between January 2005 and Decem-
ber 2006. Using segmented linear regression models, they estimate that the intro-
duction of Medicare Part D increased drug use by 3 to 37 percent and decreased
out-of-pocket spending by 37 to 58 percent.
Kaestner and Khan (2012) employ data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS), which contains detailed information on expenditures and drug use.
They estimate that the introduction of Medicare Part D increased prescription drug
use among the previously uninsured elderly by 30 percent and drug expenditures by
40 percent, and that this e↵ect was largest for low-income minority groups.
Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) estimate that Medicare Part D resulted in a 75
percent crowd-out of other prescription drug insurance coverage. Despite this e↵ect,
they estimate that Medicare Part D caused a sizeable reduction in out-of-pocket
spending, comparable to the deadweight loss of financing the program.
Increases in drug utilization are beneficial only to the extent that they improve
health (net of spending). However, surprisingly little is known about the e↵ects of
Medicare Part D on health outcomes.7 One exception is a contemporaneous study
by Kaestner, Long, and Alexander (2014), who examine Medicare enrollment data
and estimate that Medicare Part D did not have a statistically significant e↵ect on
mortality.8 There are two main di↵erences between their study and ours. First,
the treatment group in our analysis consists of all 66-year-olds. Kaestner et al.’s
treatment group, by contrast, includes a larger age range (66-84), but also excludes all
Medicare Advantage enrollees, dual eligibles, individuals with end-stage renal disease,
the disabled, and non-whites. Thus their estimated treatment e↵ect applies to a
population that is, on average, older, richer, and more white than the population we
study. This last di↵erence is important because, as we show later, a large portion of
our estimated e↵ect is attributable to non-whites.
Second, the two studies employ di↵erent empirical designs. We compare changes
in mortality among 66-year-olds to changes in mortality among 64-year-olds. By
7Prior to Part D, many beneficiaries gained drug coverage through Medicare Advantage programs.
Gowrisankaran, Town, and Barrette (2011) present evidence that drug coverage reduces mortality
rates for those enrolled in Medicare HMO’s.
8We note, however, that our estimates are within the 95 percent confidence intervals of their
estimates and thus are not ruled out by their analysis.
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contrast, Kaestner, Long, and Alexander (2014) identify their e↵ect by exploiting
geographic and socioeconomic variation in pre-existing prescription drug coverage
rates for the elderly (aged 66 and older) prior to 2006, the year of Medicare Part D’s
implementation. In other words, they compare changes in elderly mortality in groups
with low pre-existing drug coverage rates to groups with high pre-existing coverage
rates.
3.2 Data
We obtain confidential mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System of
the National Center for Health Statistics for the years 2001-2008. These data provide
demographic state of residence information for the universe of deaths that occurred
in the United States. Table 3.1, which follows the same basic classification scheme
used in Ruhm (2013), displays causes of death for the elderly population during the
time period 2001-2008. The single largest category is cardiovascular disease, the main
cause of death in 40 percent of all elderly deaths. The second leading cause is cancer,
responsible for 22 percent of elderly deaths. The remaining 38 percent of deaths are
due to other diseases or accidents. Our primary estimation sample, which includes
only 64- and 66-year-old decedents, consists of 518,514 deaths that occurred between
2001 and 2008.
We obtain corresponding intercensal population estimates from the Surveillance,
Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program of the National Cancer Institute.
These allow us to convert our data on number of deaths to a death rate, which is
more suitable for analysis.
Finally, we obtain data on prescription drug use and expenditures from the pre-
scription drug component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The
MEPS is a nationally representative survey of U.S. households, and its measures of
prescription drug spending have been shown to closely match administrative measures
from the National Health Expenditure Accounts (Bernard et al. 2012). Each survey
has a two-year overlapping panel design, with each panel consisting of five rounds of
interviews that take place over two full calendar years. We use the Full-Year Consol-
idated Data files in our analysis. These data consist of variables measured at the end
of each calendar year, with each individual appearing in the data twice. The overlap-
ping panel design means that, for any given year, our sample includes individuals in
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their first year of the panel and individuals in their second year of the panel.
For each drug they consume, MEPS respondents report an associated medical con-
dition.9 Each self-reported medical condition is then translated into ICD-9 codes (a
common classification standard) by professional medical coders. Importantly for our
analysis, these same medical codes are used to classify causes of death in the mortality
data. Table 3.2 shows the average drug use and drug expenditures, by drug insurance
status, among the young-elderly population for di↵erent medical conditions in the
years prior to the implementation of Medicare Part D. Unsurprisingly, individuals
who lack drug insurance consume fewer drugs and spend less on them. The largest
categories in terms of either utilization or expenditures are treatments for heart dis-
ease, diabetes, lipid metabolism disorders, and digestive disorders. Appendix B lists
the three most common drugs prescribed in each of these categories along with their
primary uses. We also note in Table 3.2 that although lipid metabolism disorders
and diabetes are categorized as “other diseases,” individuals who su↵er from these
illnesses are very likely to die from cardiovascular disease.10
Table 3.2 reports that cancer prescription drug consumption was significantly
lower than other types of prescription drug consumption during this time period.
This is because most cancer drugs are administered in a physician’s o ce and thus
are covered by Medicare Part B rather than Part D. One notable exception is oral
chemotherapy drugs. These drugs have become an important component of many
cancer treatments, but were typically not covered by traditional Medicare until the
advent of Part D (Davido↵ et al. 2013; Weingart et al. 2008). Thus, it is possible that
consumption of cancer drugs would increase following the implementation of Part D.
3.3 E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality
We pursue a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach that compares the change in state-
level mortality rates among the young-elderly to the corresponding change among
9Respondents can report up to three medical conditions for each drug, but in the vast majority
(95 percent) of cases they reported only one. For the few cases when more than one condition was
reported, we divide the associated drug use and expenditure data evenly across each condition.
10Diabetes greatly increases the risk of heart disease and stroke (Ha↵ner et al. 1998). Lipid
metabolism disorders such as elevated cholesterol levels substantially increase the risk of heart disease
(Lewington et al. 2007).
56
the near-elderly, before and after the implementation of Medicare Part D.11 A key
feature of our dataset–which includes the universe of deaths–is a large sample size
that allows us to employ narrow age bands in our analysis. The small di↵erence in
age between our control and treatment groups means they are likely to exhibit similar
trends in mortality over time.
Our primary specification includes 66-year-olds in the treatment group and 64-
year-olds in the control group. Our main identifying assumption is that, conditional
on the included controls, any trend break in mortality between these two age groups
is attributable to the Medicare Part D program.
We exclude 65-year-olds from the main analysis because of their short exposure
to Medicare Part D, which limits the ability of the program to improve their health.
For example, someone who dies one week after turning 65 probably did not have
enough time to benefit from a new prescription to lower her cholesterol. On average,
a 65-year-old decedent in our dataset has only been exposed to the benefits of Part
D for six months. By contrast, 66-year-olds have on average been exposed to the
benefits of Medicare Part D for more than one year. This is enough time for many
important drugs such as statins to exhibit beneficial e↵ects (Cannon et al. 2004). For
completeness, we report results for a specification that employs 65-year-olds as the
treatment group instead of 66-year-olds in Appendix B.
The young-elderly are significantly more likely than the near-elderly to be retired
and to have access to Medicare’s hospital and outpatient benefits. This raises the
concern that results from this analysis may be driven by large shocks such as reces-
sions or national policy changes that a↵ect the young-elderly and the near-elderly
di↵erentially. We therefore restrict our analysis to the years 2001-2008. This pro-
vides four years of data following the implementation of the Medicare prescription
drug programs, but avoids potential confounding e↵ects from the Great Recession
(McInerney and Mellor 2012). In Appendix B, we report results from specifications
that employ time windows of di↵ering lengths.
11We follow Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) and aggregate to the state level, which allows us
to control for state-level factors that may be important determinants of mortality, but one could
alternatively estimate our di↵erence-in-di↵erences model at a di↵erent level of aggregation. As a
robustness check, we confirmed that our results are not substantively a↵ected if we aggregate to the
national level rather than the state level.
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3.3.1 Event study framework
We first employ an event study framework that allows for heterogeneous e↵ects over
time in both the pre- and post-periods. This specification is less statistically pow-
erful than the more parametric regression we employ later, but it will allow us to
evaluate whether the parallel trends assumption we maintain throughout this paper
is reasonable. Our estimating equation is:
ln(DEATHSast) =  1ELDERLYa +  2 ln(POPast) +Xst 
+
2008X
⌧=2001,⌧ 6=2004
 ⌧ (ELDERLYa ⇤ 1[⌧ = t]) + ↵s +  t + ✏ast (3.1)
The outcome variable is the log of the count of deaths in age group a, state s, and year
t. There are two age groups: 66-year-olds and 64-year-olds. The indicator variable
ELDERLYa is equal to 1 if the age group is 66-year-olds and 0 otherwise. The
variable ln(POPast) is the log of the state- and age-group-specific population in year
t. This model includes a full set of state (↵s) and year ( t) fixed e↵ects. The state-
level control variables Xst were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
include per capita income, employment level, per capita government medical spending
(excluding Medicare spending), and private health care spending.12 The coe cients of
interest in this event study analysis are the  ⌧ ’s on the interaction between the elderly
indicator variable and the indicator function 1[⌧ = t]. All estimates are weighted by
the square-root of the relevant population.
We cluster standard errors at the state level to allow for heteroskedasticity and
arbitrary serial correlation within states over time.13 We also estimate a large series
of placebo regressions (which should not produce statistically significant estimates) in
order to confirm that our approach to inference does not understate standard errors.
We expect (but do not require) any potential e↵ects of Medicare Part D to begin
in 2005 because of the widespread availability and use of the drug discount cards and
subsidies provided by the Medicare Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance
Programs, which were launched in mid-2004. Recall that the Transitional Assistance
12These data are available at http://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm.
13This is consistent with the prior literature (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008). We have also
estimated specifications that cluster standard errors at the age ⇥ year level and find that this
increases the statistical significance of our results. To be conservative, we cluster at the state level
in the main text.
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Program spent $1.5 billion on prescription drug subsidies for low-income elderly who
could prove that they lacked drug coverage. Vulnerable populations such as this one
are more likely than the general adult population to demonstrate health improvements
following an increase in their health benefits (Levy and Meltzer 2004).
The first panel of Figure 3.1 plots estimates of  ⌧ from equation (3.1) when we
employ deaths from all causes as the dependent variable. Each point estimate reports
the change in young-elderly mortality relative to the change in near-elderly mortality.
Results are normalized to be relative to the baseline year, 2004. We observe an initial
decline in young-elderly mortality in 2005 followed by another in 2006. The e↵ect
then remains visible through 2008. The other panels of Figure 3.1 display estimates
of  ⌧ when equation (3.1) is estimated separately for each of the three main cause-
of-death subcategories: cardiovascular, cancer, and other diseases. Cardiovascular
deaths among the young-elderly decrease dramatically beginning in 2005 and then
remain constant through 2008. Other disease mortality also decreases among the
young-elderly beginning in 2005, although more gradually than for cardiovascular
mortality. When we estimate our model using cancer deaths, however, we do not see
any lasting e↵ects in the post-period for the young-elderly.
None of the plots in Figure 3.1 exhibits di↵erential trends in mortality between
the young- and near-elderly prior to 2004, which provides support for our identifying
assumption. Moreover, the estimated e↵ects of the Part D program are visible be-
ginning in 2005–especially for cardiovascular mortality–suggesting that the 2004-2005
Drug Discount and Transitional Assistance Programs successfully increased the use
of e↵ective drug treatments among the uninsured elderly population.
Next, we examine the cardiovascular mortality results in more detail by estimating
that model separately by gender and race. Those results are shown in Figures 3.2
and 3.3. The estimated e↵ects are largest for males and non-whites. The latter is
consistent with prior research finding that much of the increase in drug utilization
caused by Medicare Part D occurred among low-income and minority individuals
(Kaestner and Khan 2012).
Obtaining prescription drugs requires access to medical professionals. This means
the e↵ect of Medicare Part D may vary across states with di↵erent levels of physician
availability. Indeed, Clayton (2014) finds that the e↵ectiveness of early Medicaid
prescription drug coverage expansions is much greater for states with a relatively
high supply of physicians than for those with a relatively low supply. We explore
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the applicability of this finding to our setting by estimating our model separately
for states with a high (above median) or low (below median) number of physicians
per capita using data from the Area Health Resource File. Figure 3.4 shows that–
consistent with Clayton (2014)–the estimated e↵ect is larger for states with more
physicians per capita.
We do not expect to see any e↵ects of Medicare Part D on deaths due to external
causes because, as shown in Table 3.2, there is almost no drug consumption associated
with these deaths. We thus do not present results for this subcategory of deaths in
the main text. However, we make estimates for this category available in Appendix
B as part of a falsification exercise.
3.3.2 Regression framework
We now impose additional structure on the regression model (3.1) by requiring the  ⌧
coe cients to be constant in the pre- and post-periods, which will generate more pre-
cise estimates. An examination of Figure 3.1 suggests this is a reasonable assumption.
Our new estimating equation is:
ln(DEATHSast) =  1ELDERLYa +  2 ln(POPast) +Xst 
+  (ELDERLYa ⇤ POST05t) + ↵s +  t + ✏ast (3.2)
The variables are defined the same way as in equation (3.1). The parameter of interest
is  , the coe cient on the interaction term ELDERLYa⇤POST05t, where POST05t
is an indicator equal to 1 during 2005-2008 and 0 otherwise.
Results for the full sample of decedents are reported in the first two columns of
Table 3.3. The second column, which includes all control variables, estimates that
the annual death rate for 66-year-olds fell by 2.2 percent, relative to 64-year-olds, in
the initial years 2005-2008 following the implementation of Medicare Part D. This is
driven primarily by cardiovascular mortality, which declined by 4.4 percent. These
correspond to absolute reductions of 0.036 and 0.023 percentage points, respectively.14
The estimated e↵ects for cancer and other diseases are not statistically significant,
although we cannot rule out the possibility of modestly sized e↵ects for these two
14The total death rate and cardiovascular death rate for 66-year-olds between 2001 and 2004 are
1.629 percent and 0.521 percent annually, respectively.
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categories.15
Columns (3)-(6) show how these estimates vary by gender and race. All subgroups
except for females experienced a significant decline in young-elderly cardiovascular
mortality. All subgroups except for females also experienced a significant decline in
all-cause mortality. The magnitudes are greatest for males and for non-whites. No
subgroup experienced a significant decline in young-elderly cancer mortality.
Table 3.4 shows that our results also vary by physician density. Column (1) repli-
cates our main result from Table 3.3. Columns (2) and (3) show that the estimated
e↵ects for all deaths, and cardiovascular deaths in particular, are larger for states
with a high (above-median) number of physicians per capita than for states with a
low (below-median) number.
Appendix B examines the robustness of our results by estimating several alterna-
tive specifications. These include employing death rates instead of the log of death
counts as the dependent variable; employing 65-year-olds instead of 66-year-olds as
the treatment group; employing younger ages for the control group and/or older ages
for the treatment group; increasing the number of years in the sample; and decreasing
the number of years in the sample. Our main results hold up across all these di↵erent
specifications.
Finally, Appendix B also reports results for two di↵erent sets of placebo exercises.
The first set estimates our main specification but employs di↵erent pairwise combina-
tions of ages drawn from the under-65 population, the majority of whom are ineligible
for Medicare Part D, as the treatment and control groups. The second uses our main
specification to estimate the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on deaths due to external
causes, for which there is nearly zero associated prescription drug consumption. In
neither case do we find significant e↵ects.
3.3.3 Discussion
Our main specification estimates that annual mortality for 66-year-olds decreased by
2.2 percent relative to 64-year-olds in the initial years following the implementation
of Medicare Part D. This is driven primarily by a decrease of 4.4 percent in cardio-
vascular mortality. One way to gauge the size of these e↵ects is to compare them to
overall trends during this time period. Between 2001-2004 and 2005-2008, the total
15The 95 percent confidence intervals for cancer and other diseases are [-2.6, 2.1] and [-5.2, 0.7],
respectively.
61
and cardiovascular mortality rates for 66-year-olds fell by 8.32 and 17.1 percent, re-
spectively. Our estimates therefore explain about 25 percent of both these reductions.
By way of comparison, Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (1999) estimate that nearly
30 percent of the decline in 30-day mortality due to heart attacks between 1975 and
1995 can be attributed to pharmaceuticals.
Comparing to other studies of health insurance also provides a useful gauge. Our
estimate is of course larger than estimates from other studies that find no e↵ect of
health insurance on adult mortality, although we note that our estimate is within
the bounds of their 95 percent confidence intervals (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008;
Kaestner, Long, and Alexander 2014). It is smaller, however, than what many other
studies have found. Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) estimate that Medicare re-
duced annual mortality by 4.3 percent for young-elderly California patients admitted
to emergency departments with non-deferrable conditions.16 Sommers, Long, and
Baicker (2014) estimate that the Massachusetts 2006 health care reform reduced non-
elderly adult mortality by 2.9 percent, and Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein (2012)
estimate that state Medicaid expansions that occurred between 2000 and 2005 re-
duced non-elderly adult mortality by 6.1 percent. It is not surprising that these other
studies find larger e↵ects than we do. These insurance expansions cover hospital
and outpatient care, which may be more likely to save lives than prescription drugs.
The Massachusetts and Medicaid expansions also included drug insurance benefits.
Furthermore, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) examine a relatively sick patient
population with a significantly higher mortality rate than the average mortality rate
of our treatment group.
Our empirical design yields intent-to-treat estimates that represent a lower bound
on the e↵ect of prescription drug insurance on mortality. If one is willing to assume
that our estimated e↵ect is attributable entirely to previously uninsured individuals
who gained drug coverage, then we can calculate the e↵ect of drug insurance, rather
than just drug insurance eligibility, on mortality. This is not a trivial assumption,
because the treatment group in our analysis includes previously insured individuals
who switched plans as a result of Part D, which may also have contributed to our esti-
mated e↵ect of Part D on mortality. Nevertheless, this calculation yields a parameter
of interest that can be compared to other studies. Dividing our main result by the
16Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) estimate that Medicare reduced annual mortality by 1 per-
centage point. Annual mortality for their sample was 23 percent.
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estimated 23 percent of the young-elderly population who gained prescription drug
coverage for the first time as a result of Part D (Kaestner and Khan 2012) yields an
estimated treatment-on-the-treated e↵ect of 9.6 percent. This is several times smaller
than the corresponding treatment-on-the-treated e↵ect estimates for the comparison
studies mentioned above. For example, Medicare reduced the uninsured rate among
the young-elderly population studied in Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) by 8 per-
centage points, and the Massachusetts health reform reduced that state’s non-elderly
adult uninsured rate by 6.8 percentage points (Sommers, Long, and Baicker 2014).
These imply treatment-on-the-treated e↵ects of 54 and 43 percent, respectively.
Another alternative gauge is medical studies of drug treatments, although this
comparison is not straightforward because the increase in drug utilization caused by
Medicare Part D was not limited to a single drug. This caveat notwithstanding,
studies of statins–a common cardiovascular treatment in our sample–indicate that
they can work quickly, with e↵ects apparent as early as 30 days after the start of
treatment (Cannon et al. 2004). The magnitude of the estimated e↵ects of statins
on mortality is significant: Aronow et al. (2001) estimate that they reduce 6-month
mortality by over 30 percent for individuals with stable coronary disease.
3.4 E↵ect of Medicare Part D on utilization
What is the channel for the Medicare Part D mortality e↵ects we found in the pre-
vious section? One likely explanation is that the reduction in the consumer price of
drugs encouraged greater utilization among the newly insured, which then improved
health.17 In this section we use the 2001-2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys
(MEPS) to examine how the increased utilization caused by Part D varied by type of
drug and by socioeconomic status. We expect the increase to be largest for cardio-
vascular drugs, and for individuals whose incomes were low enough that they were
unlikely to have had pre-existing private prescription drug coverage, but not so low
that they might be eligible for drug coverage through Medicaid.
We again employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erences model to estimate changes in drug use
between the young-elderly (ages 66-75) and the near-elderly (ages 55-64) following
17Medicare Part D also resulted in a positive income e↵ect for the elderly, which may have improved
their health. If 64-year-olds are forward-looking, however, they will anticipate this future income
e↵ect and adjust their behavior accordingly. Thus, it is unlikely that the relative di↵erence in
mortality trends between 66- and 64-year-olds is explainable solely by income e↵ects.
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the implementation of Medicare Part D. We omit age 65 from the sample to ensure
consistency with our previous mortality analysis, although this does not matter for
our results. We use 10-year age bands in this analysis rather than one-year age bands
because the small sample size of the MEPS reduces statistical power, especially when
we estimate the model for di↵erent types of drugs.
We begin by estimating the following equation:
DRUGSit =  1ELDERLYi +  (ELDERLYi ⇤ POST05t) +Xit  +  t + ✏it (3.3)
The indicator variable ELDERLYi takes on a value of 1 if the individual belongs
to the young-elderly group (ages 66-75) and 0 otherwise. We include year fixed
e↵ects to allow for arbitrary national trends in drug consumption. We also include an
individual-level set of controls, Xit, which includes marital status, race, educational
attainment, gender, census region, and household income groups.18 The parameter
of interest is  , the coe cient on the interaction ELDERLYi ⇤ POST05t, where
POST05t is an indicator for the post-period 2005-2008. We employ the MEPS-
provided sampling weights in order to generate nationally representative estimates.
We follow Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) and cluster standard errors by household ⇥
age group. State identifiers are unavailable in the public version of the MEPS.
The dependent variable, DRUGSit, is either drug use (measured as number of
prescriptions filled) or drug expenditures by individual i in year t. Drug use is our
preferred outcome of interest because it is an unambiguous measure of health care
utilization. Although drug use and expenditures are related, the latter is confounded
with price changes. For example, Medicare’s Drug Discount Card Program reduced
the prices faced by consumers and thus likely increased drug use. Because these price
reductions were the result of negotiating discounts with drug manufacturers (i.e., they
are not subsidies paid by Medicare), the sign of the e↵ect on total expenditures is
ambiguous and depends on the price elasticity of demand for pharmaceutical drugs.19
We report results by drug type in Table 3.5. The bottom row indicates that
18Marital status: never married, married, divorced/separated, or widowed. Race: white or non-
white. Educational attainment: no high school degree, high school degree, some college, or college
degree. Household income group: see Table 3.6 for definitions. Census region: Northeast, Midwest,
South, or West.
19There is not a consensus on whether demand for pharmaceutical drugs is inelastic. For example,
Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) estimate an elasticity of -0.72, but Lakdawalla and Philipson (2012)
estimate an elasticity between -1.1 and -1.25.
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the implementation of Medicare Part D increased total per capita drug use by 3.08
prescription fills per year and increased total per capita expenditures by $244 for the
young-elderly, relative to the near-elderly. These correspond to increases of 17 and
20 percent, respectively, when compared to their pre-2005 levels for the uninsured.
The other rows of Table 3.5 show how these increases are distributed across dif-
ferent types of drugs. Similar to Zimmer (2014), we observe a significant increase
in the utilization of drugs used to treat ischemic and hypertensive heart disease, di-
abetes, and lipid metabolism disorders, each of which is linked to increased risk of
cardiovascular death. Table 3.5 reports relative increases of 26, 26, and 31 percent for
these three categories, respectively, when compared to pre-2005 baseline levels. The
corresponding estimates for drug expenditures for these categories are similar to the
estimates for utilization.
Importantly, we observe no statistically significant increases in the utilization of,
or expenditures for, cancer drugs and its subcategories. As discussed earlier, most
cancer drugs were already covered by Medicare Part B, with the important exception
of oral chemotherapy drugs. While the positive point estimates for total cancer drug
use and expenditures suggest that utilization of these drugs may have increased, it
was not widespread enough for us to detect it statistically.
3.4.1 Results by subgroup
Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for the young-elderly of di↵ering income levels
in 2003, the year in which the Medicare Part D legislation was enacted. Prescription
drug insurance coverage rates range from 59 percent for individuals with incomes
between 100% and 125% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) to 80 percent for in-
dividuals with incomes above 400% of the FPL. The drug insurance coverage rate
for individuals in the lowest income group (<100% FPL) is actually higher than it
is for those with slightly higher incomes. This can be attributed to Medicaid, which
provided prescription drug coverage to its beneficiaries during this time period.20 The
fraction of very low-income (<100% FPL) individuals who report being enrolled in
Medicaid is about double the number in the second-lowest income group (100% FPL
20In fact, at the time there were concerns that Medicare Part D would actually have a negative
e↵ect on drug utilization for these dual eligibles because of increased cost-sharing and because of
the complexities involved in switching to a di↵erent prescription drug coverage program (Basu, Yin,
and Alexander 2010; Domino and Farley 2010).
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 Income < 125% FPL). This di↵erence is significant and may actually understate the
true magnitude, since the MEPS undercounts national Medicaid enrollment figures
by more than 10 percent (Bernard et al. 2012; Nelson 2003).
We investigate how this increase in utilization varies over time and across the five
di↵erent income groups displayed in Table 3.6 by estimating an event-study regression
that allows for heterogeneous treatment e↵ects:
DRUGSigt =  1ELDERLYi +Xigt 
+
5X
g=1
2008X
⌧=2001,⌧ 6=2004
 g⌧ (GROUPg ⇤ ELDERLYi ⇤ 1[⌧ = t]) +  t + ✏igt
(3.4)
The dependent variable is drug use by individual i in income group g at time t.
The constant e↵ects of income on drug use are captured in the control vector Xigt.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plot estimates of  g⌧ from equation (3.4) for total drug use and
cardiovascular drug use, respectively. The increase in both total and cardiovascular
drug utilization is largest for individuals with incomes between 100% and 125% FPL,
the group with the lowest rate of pre-existing prescription drug coverage, although
the estimated e↵ects are not statistically significant. We note that individuals in
this group were also the ones most likely to qualify for subsidies from the 2004-2005
Transitional Assistance Program, which required that individuals demonstrate both
a lack of drug insurance coverage and an income below 135% FPL. Indeed, Figures
3.5 and 3.6 show an increase in utilization for these individuals beginning already
in 2004, although we caution that these estimates are not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, this suggests that Medicare Part D’s 2004-2005 interim programs were
successful in their goal of providing relief from the costs of prescription drugs to
low-income Medicare beneficiaries who lacked prescription drug coverage.
Next, we require the treatment e↵ect to be constant in the pre- and post-periods in
order to generate more precise estimates, as we did in the mortality analysis. We also
examine heterogeneity by gender and race. Let there be g = 1...G groups that might
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exhibit heterogeneous treatment e↵ects. Then our estimating equation becomes:
DRUGSigt =  1ELDERLYi +Xigt 
+
GX
g=1
 g(GROUPg ⇤ ELDERLYi ⇤ POST05t) +  t + ✏igt (3.5)
Column (1) of Table 3.7 reports how the estimated treatment e↵ect varies across
di↵erent income groups. Everybody except those in the lowest income category ex-
perienced a statistically significant increase in drug use. Individuals with incomes
between 100% and 125% FPL, who had the lowest rate of pre-existing drug insurance
coverage, experienced the largest increase: relative to the near-elderly, their prescrip-
tion drug use increased by 8.35 fills per year. Columns (2) and (3) report results
from similar regressions that examine heterogeneity by gender and race rather than
income. Males and females exhibit similar increases in utilization, while the increase
for non-whites is 45 percent larger than the increase for whites. Although the racial
di↵erence is large, we do not have enough power to conclude that the coe cients in
column (3) are statistically di↵erent from each other.
3.4.2 Discussion
Consistent with prior studies, we estimate that Medicare Part D significantly in-
creased drug utilization. This is not the only possible mechanism for improving
health. For example, consumers might switch to more e↵ective medications rather
than just increasing consumption. Nevertheless, we find that these changes in drug
usage are consistent with our prior mortality findings. The utilization of cardiovas-
cular drugs, but not cancer drugs, greatly increased, and these increases were larger
in magnitude for non-whites than for whites. Moreover, this increase in utilization
appears to have begun as early as 2004 for those individuals who were most likely to
qualify for the Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance Programs.
One exception is drug utilization patterns for males and females, which look similar
following the implementation of Medicare Part D despite our finding that males expe-
rienced a larger subsequent drop in mortality. There are several possible explanations
for this discrepancy. First, the MEPS sample we employ is relatively small, which
causes the estimates to be imprecise. For example, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that male drug utilization increased by twice as much as female drug utilization did.
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Second, we do not have enough power to detect di↵erential changes in subcategories
of drug consumption. That is, it is possible that males, but not females, switched
from non-cardiovascular to cardiovascular drugs following the implementation of Part
D. Finally, the discrepancy might be attributable to heterogeneous treatment e↵ects
of prescription drugs. Existing studies examining sex-based di↵erences among car-
diovascular treatments conclude that they benefit males more than females (Mosca
et al. 2011; Rathore, Wang, and Krumholz 2002). A limitation of our analysis is that
we cannot distinguish between these competing hypotheses.
3.5 Social value of the estimated mortality reduc-
tion
We calculate the value of the mortality reduction associated with Medicare Part D in
its initial years by multiplying the number of life-years saved by $100,000, a common
estimate of the value of a statistical life-year (Cutler 2004). Readers who prefer a
di↵erent value may adjust accordingly, since our estimated benefit is linear in this
value.
We previously estimated that Medicare Part D led to an annual mortality reduc-
tion of 2.2 percent during its initial years. Converting this estimate into life-years
saved requires making assumptions about two important factors not fully addressed
in our empirical analysis: the size of the a↵ected population and the magnitude of
the longevity increase.
The treatment group in our mortality analysis includes only 66-year-olds. Using
a narrow age band increases the plausibility of our main identifying assumption, but
also means that, strictly speaking, our estimates only apply to 66-year-olds. It is not
clear a priori whether the e↵ect of Part D on mortality should be larger or smaller for
individuals over the age of 66, although in Appendix B we present evidence suggesting
that the e↵ect may be slightly larger for older age groups. For the purposes of this
exercise, we assume that the e↵ect of Part D is the same for all individuals aged 66 or
older. Obviously our calculated benefit would be larger (smaller) if the true mortality
reduction for the older elderly is larger (smaller) than it is for 66-year-olds.
Applying our main estimate of a 2.2 percent mortality reduction to the elderly
population yields the number of lives saved by Medicare Part D. It is not straightfor-
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ward to convert this to the number of life-years saved. The individuals whose lives
were saved by the introduction of Medicare Part D likely had lower life expectancies
than a typical member of the elderly population. Failing to account for this lower
life expectancy will bias estimates of the social cost, as discussed in Deryugina et
al. (2016). As a benchmark, Cutler (2004) estimates that the historical reduction in
cardiovascular mortality increased longevity by about four years. Because the bulk
of our estimated mortality decline is due to a reduction in cardiovascular mortality,
we adopt his estimate for our analysis.
Applying all these assumptions to our empirical estimate yields an estimated initial
health benefit of about $16 billion.21 In order to be conservative, we assume that in
later years the benefit accrues only to new beneficiaries, which implies a subsequent
annual benefit of about $1 billion.22 Together these two estimates imply an average
benefit of $5 (= (16 + 3)/4) billion per year for the four years that make up the
post period in our empirical analysis. We note that this amount does not account for
other potential health benefits of the Medicare Part D program, such as a reduction
in morbidity, and thus should be viewed as a lower bound on the program’s total
health benefits.
Our estimated value of $5 billion lies in-between estimates of other, non-health
benefits that have been attributed to the Medicare Part D program. Engelhardt and
Gruber (2011) present evidence that Medicare Part D reduced financial risk by re-
ducing out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries and compute that the certainty equivalent
of this risk reduction is equal to $14 billion annually. Kaestner, Long, and Alexan-
der (2014) estimate that Medicare Part D reduced annual hospital expenditures by
$1.5 billion. Combining these two estimates together with ours yields a total annual
benefit of $20.5 billion.
One can also compare our estimated benefit to the estimated social costs of Medi-
care Part D. Prior work has pointed to the deadweight loss of raising funds as the
primary social cost of this program (Engelhardt and Gruber 2011). The literature
on this topic estimates that the marginal cost of raising public funds in the United
States is about $0.30 per dollar of revenue raised (Jorgenson and Yun 2002). This
implies that the deadweight loss associated with Medicare Part D was $14 billion per
21Prior the implementation of Medicare Part D, there were about 36 million elderly and the annual
elderly mortality rate was about 5 percent. $16 billion = 36 million⇥0.05⇥ 0.022⇥ 4⇥ $100, 000.
22There were about 2.1 million 65-year-olds alive in 2004. $1 billion = 2.1 million ⇥0.05⇥0.022⇥
4⇥ $100, 000.
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year, or nearly three times larger than our estimated mortality benefit.
3.6 Conclusion
The e↵ect of health insurance on health is a fundamental question for policymakers.
We investigate the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality, the ultimate indicator
of health. This program provides coverage for prescription drugs–an increasingly
important component of medical treatment–to tens of millions of elderly Americans.
We estimate that it reduced annual mortality by 2.2 percent in its initial years.
Further analysis shows that this was due primarily to a reduction in cardiovascular
mortality. A secondary analysis confirms that Medicare Part D increased the use of
drug treatments for cardiovascular disease and that the changes in drug utilization
over time and across di↵erent socioeconomic groups are broadly consistent with the
mortality patterns we observe. Under reasonable assumptions, we calculate that the
annual value of the health gains from reduced mortality is equal to $5 billion.
Detecting changes in mortality is di cult because deaths are a rare occurrence
in most datasets. We overcome this obstacle by employing the universe of death
records to take advantage of quasi-random variation in the age-eligibility for Medicare.
Importantly, our results do not appear to be driven by di↵erential pre-existing trends
in mortality between our treatment and control groups, and placebo exercises confirm
that Medicare Part D did not have any significant e↵ects on individuals just under
the age of 65.
Our results confirm the basic theoretical prediction that reducing the price of
medical care should improve health. This paper focuses on mortality because it is
easily measured, but quality of life, another important health outcome, is also likely
to improve as a result of gaining access to drug insurance. That remains an area for
future research.
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3.7 Tables and figures
Table 3.1: Causes of death for individuals aged 65 and over, 2001-2008
Cause&of&Death Average&Deaths&Per&Year Percent&of&Total
Cardiovascular 713,795 40.01%
!!!!!Heart!Disease 555,453 31.13%
!!!!!!!!!!Heart!Failure 53,461 3.00%
!!!!!!!!!!Ischemic!and!Hypertension 413,135 23.16%
!!!!!!!!!!Other!Heart 88,858 4.98%
!!!!!Cerebrovascular!(Stroke) 128,476 7.20%
!!!!!Peripheral!Vascular 6,430 0.36%
!!!!!Other!CVD 23,435 1.31%
Cancer 389,159 21.81%
!!!!!Digestive 89,143 5.00%
!!!!!Lung 114,713 6.43%
!!!!!Breast 23,917 1.34%
!!!!!Genital 42,699 2.39%
!!!!!Lymph 40,414 2.27%
!!!!!Bladder 11,010 0.62%
!!!!!Thyroid 1,038 0.06%
!!!!!Other!Cancer 66,226 3.71%
Other=Diseases 636,999 35.70%
!!!!!Diabetes 53,410 2.99%
!!!!!Alzheimer's 67,194 3.77%
!!!!!Chronic!Lower!Respiratory 109,987 6.16%
!!!!!Kidney 36,249 2.03%
!!!!!!!!!!Renal!Failure 34,898 1.96%
!!!!!!!!!!Other!Kidney 1,352 0.08%
!!!!!Upper!Respiratory 363 0.02%
!!!!!Respiratory!Failure 3,120 0.17%
!!!!!Lipid!Metabolism 5,181 0.29%
!!!!!Digestive!System 54,856 3.07%
!!!!!Parkinson's 18,197 1.02%
!!!!!Pneumonia 52,099 2.92%
!!!!!Other 236,343 13.25%
External=Causes 44,196 2.48%
!!!!!Transport!Accidents 7,742 0.43%
!!!!!Non[transport!Accidents 29,879 1.67%
!!!!!!!!!!Falls 15,449 0.87%
!!!!!!!!!!Drowning/Submersion 453 0.03%
!!!!!!!!!!Smoke/Fires/Flame 1,091 0.06%
!!!!!!!!!!Poison/Noxious!Substance 967 0.05%
!!!!!!!!!!Other!Accidents 11,920 0.67%
!!!!!Suicide 5,408 0.30%
!!!!!Homicide 840 0.05%
!!!!!Other!External!Causes 328 0.02%
Total 1,784,149 100.00%
Notes: This table shows the average number of deaths per year for di↵erent causes of death in the
2001-2008 National Vital Statistics dataset.
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Table 3.2: Prescription drug utilization and expenditures by the young-elderly, 2001-2004
Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured
Cardiovascular 7.31 4.81 $411 $264 X
*****Heart*Disease 7.02 4.65 $391 $251 X
**********Heart*Failure 0.28 0.23 $12 $11 X
**********Ischemic*and*Hypertension 5.22 3.67 $295 $200 X
**********Other*Heart 1.52 0.74 $84 $40 X
*****Cerebrovascular*(Stroke) 0.15 0.10 $10 $8 X
*****Peripheral*Vascular 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 X
*****Other*CVD 0.14 0.06 $10 $5 X
Cancer 0.19 0.12 $21 $9
*****Digestive 0.02 0.01 $3 $1
*****Lung 0.01 0.03 $1 $1
*****Breast 0.07 0.02 $10 $3
*****Genital 0.04 0.02 $3 $2
*****Lymph 0.01 0.00 $0 $0
*****Bladder 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
*****Thyroid 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
*****Other*Cancer 0.04 0.03 $3 $2
Other1Diseases 18.32 11.81 $1,340 $861
*****Diabetes 2.37 1.53 $168 $108 X
*****Alzheimer's 0.03 0.05 $4 $7
*****Chronic*Lower*Respiratory 0.99 0.49 $73 $33
*****Kidney 0.10 0.04 $6 $2
**********Renal*Failure 0.03 0.02 $2 $1
**********Other*Kidney 0.06 0.02 $4 $1
*****Upper*Respiratory 0.71 0.31 $48 $18
*****Respiratory*Failure 0.05 0.05 $4 $2
*****Lipid*Metabolism 1.79 1.14 $202 $130 X
*****Digestive*System 1.27 0.78 $134 $108
*****Parkinson's 0.10 0.06 $10 $5
*****Pneumonia 0.04 0.02 $2 $1
*****Other 10.89 7.33 $690 $447
External1Causes 0.09 0.07 $5 $3
*****Transport*Accidents 0.07 0.06 $4 $3
*****Non[transport*Accidents 0.02 0.01 $1 $0
**********Falls 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
**********Drowning/Submersion 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
**********Smoke/Fires/Flame 0.01 0.00 $0 $0
**********Poison/Noxious*Substance 0.01 0.00 $0 $0
**********Other*Accidents 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
*****Suicide 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
*****Homicide 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
*****Other*External*Causes 0.00 0.00 $0 $0
Unspecified 1.68 1.05 $100 $56
Total 27.58 17.85 $1,877 $1,193
Medical2Condition
Number2of2Drugs Expenditures Cardio2
Death2Risk
Notes: This table displays the annual average per capita utilization and expenditures for prescrip-
tion drugs for respondents aged 66-75 in the 2001-2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).
The fraction of respondents reporting zero prescriptions is 9.7 percent. Expenditures include pay-
ments made by respondents and insurers. Estimates are calculated using the MEPS-provided survey
weights and are computed separately for uninsured and insured respondents, where “uninsured”
means the individual lacks prescription drug insurance. The last column indicates whether the
medical condition associated with the respondents’ prescriptions is linked to increased risk of car-
diovascular death.
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Table 3.3: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66
Any$Cause$of$Death /0.021 * /0.022 ** /0.035 ** /0.009 /0.019 * /0.036 *
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.016)
Cardiovascular /0.044 ** /0.044 ** /0.057 ** /0.030 /0.041 ** /0.051 *
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022)
Cancer /0.002 /0.002 /0.006 0.000 0.005 /0.038
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.030)
Other /0.019 /0.022 /0.039 * /0.003 /0.029 /0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.027)
State$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent'variable
Gender Race
Male Female White Non8white
(2)
Full'sample
(1)
Coefficient'on'Post05*Elderly
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 2001-2008 National
Vital Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age group a in state s in year t. Each
row and column corresponds to a separate regression for a specific cause of death used as an outcome
variable in equation (3.2). The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51).
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the
square-root of population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 3.4: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66, by physician density
Any$Cause$of$Death /0.022 ** /0.027 ** /0.021
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
Cardiovascular /0.044 ** /0.062 ** /0.016
(0.013) (0.015) (0.025)
Cancer /0.002 0.002 /0.017
(0.012) (0.015) (0.022)
Other /0.022 /0.025 /0.029
(0.015) (0.022) (0.017)
State$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes
Year$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Coefficient)on)Post05*Elderly
(1)
Full)sample
Dependent)variable
Physicians)per)capita
Above)median Below)median
(2) (3)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 2001-2008 National
Vital Statistics. The physician data are obtained from the Area Health Resource File. The dependent
variable is the log of deaths for age group a in state s in year t. Each row and column corresponds to
a separate regression for a specific cause of death used as an outcome variable in equation (3.2). The
number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51) in column (1), 400 (=8*2*25) in
column (2), and 416 (=8*2*26) in column (3). Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered
by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of population. * Significant at 5 percent.
** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 3.5: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on young-elderly drug use and expenditures
No.$of$Drugs No.$of$Drugs Expenditures
Cardiovascular 0.81** $ 31 4.81 $)264 X
)))))Heart)Disease 0.82** $ 32 4.65 $)251 X
)))))))))Heart)Failure 0.00 $ 81 0.23 $)11 X
)))))))))Ischemic)and)Hypertension 0.96** $ 45** 3.67 $)200 X
)))))))))Other)Heart 80.15 $ 812 0.74 $)40 X
)))))Cerebrovascular)(Stroke) 80.01 $ 0 0.10 $)8 X
)))))Peripheral)Vascular 0.01 $ 0 0.00 $)0 X
)))))Other)CVD 80.01 $ 82 0.06 $)5 X
Cancer 0.03 $ 34 0.12 $)9
)))))Digestive 0.01 $ 81 0.01 $)1
)))))Lung 80.00 $ 1 0.03 $)1
)))))Breast 80.02 $ 84 0.02 $)3
)))))Genital 80.01 $ 5 0.02 $)2
)))))Lymph 0.01 $ 13 0.00 $)0
)))))Bladder 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))Thyroid 0.01 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))Other)Cancer 0.03 $ 19 0.03 $)2
Other1Diseases 1.94** $ 166** 11.81 $)861
)))))Diabetes 0.40* $ 31 1.53 $)108 X
)))))Alzheimer's 80.01 $ 81 0.05 $)7
)))))Chronic)Lower)Respiratory 0.24 $ 36** 0.49 $)33
)))))Kidney 80.01 $ 6 0.04 $)2
)))))))))Renal)Failure 80.01 $ 0 0.02 $)1
)))))))))Other)Kidney 80.00 $ 6 0.02 $)1
)))))Upper)Respiratory 0.12 $ 10* 0.31 $)18
)))))Respiratory)Failure 80.00 $ 2 0.05 $)2
)))))Lipid)Metabolism 0.35** $ 34* 1.14 $)130 X
)))))Digestive)System 0.14 $ 7 0.78 $)108
)))))Parkinson's 80.02 $ 81 0.06 $)5
)))))Pneumonia 0.01 $ 1 0.02 $)1
)))))Other 0.71 $ 42 7.33 $)447
External1Causes 80.01 $ 4 0.07 $)3
)))))Transport)Accidents 80.02 $ 81 0.06 $)3
)))))Non8transport)Accidents 0.00 $ 81 0.01 $)0
)))))))))Falls 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))))))Drowning/Submersion 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))))))Smoke/Fires/Flame 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))))))Poison/Noxious)Substance 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))))))Other)Accidents 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))Suicide 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))Homicide 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
)))))Other)External)Causes 0.00 $ 0 0.00 $)0
Unspecified 0.31 $ 11 1.05 $)56
Total 3.08** $ 244** 17.85 $$1,193
Medical$Condition
Coefficient$on$Post05*Elderly PreH2005$Mean$(Uninsured) Cardio$
Death$RiskExpenditures
Notes: This table presents estimates of  , the coe cient on the interaction between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.3), using data from the 2001-2008 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey. Each row and column is a separate regression where the dependent
variable is either drug use or drug expenditure for a particular medical condition. The number
of observations in each regression is equal to 39,329. The pre-2005 means come from Table 3.2.
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by household ⇥ age group. * Significant at 5
percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics for the young-elderly, 2003 MEPS
Fraction)on)
Medicaid
Fraction))))))))))))
non-white
Fraction)))))))))
male
Has)drug)
insurance
Number)of)
observations
Income'<'100%'FPL 0.35 0.29 0.34 0.70 277
100%'FPL'<='Income'<'125%'FPL 0.18 0.23 0.39 0.59 136
125%'FPL'<='Income'<'200%'FPL 0.13 0.19 0.41 0.69 348
200%'FPL'<='Income'<'400%'FPL 0.04 0.09 0.44 0.69 590
Income'>='400%'FPL 0.02 0.09 0.50 0.80 549
Notes: This table displays weighted means for the young-elderly (aged 66-75) by income group,
using data from the 2003 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The total number of observations is
equal to 1,900.
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Table 3.7: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on total drug use among the young-elderly
Income'<'100%'FPL 1.62
(1.67)
100%'FPL'<='Income'<'125%'FPL 8.35 **
(2.67)
125%'FPL'<='Income'<'200%'FPL 3.51 *
(1.53)
200%'FPL'<='Income'<'400%'FPL 2.68 *
(1.20)
Income'>='400%'FPL 2.71 **
(0.95)
Male 3.15 **
(0.93)
Female 3.01 **
(0.96)
White 2.88 **
(0.85)
NonEwhite 4.19 **
(1.33)
Region'fixed'effects Yes Yes Yes
Year'fixed'effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number'of'observations 39,329 39,329 39,329
Group
Coefficient-on-Post05*Elderly*Group
(1) (2) (3)
Notes: This table provides estimates of  g from equation (3.5), using data from the 2001-2008
Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys. The dependent variable is drug use (prescription fills per
year). The pre-2005 means of the dependent variable for the insured and the uninsured are 27.58
and 17.85, respectively. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by household ⇥ age
group. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Figure 3.1: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66
(a) All deaths
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(b) Cardiovascular deaths
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(c) Cancer deaths
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(d) Other disease deaths
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Notes: Panels (a)-(d) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator variable and the indicator function from equation (3.1) using data from the National Vital
Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age a in state s in year t. Control variables
include log of population, an indicator variable for age group, state fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects, and
time-varying state-level control variables. Dots display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of population. The vertical line
indicates 2004, the year in which the Medicare Drug Discount and Transitional Assistance Programs
began.
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Figure 3.2: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on cardiovascular
mortality at age 66, by gender
(a) Male cardiovascular deaths
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(b) Female cardiovascular deaths
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator variable and the indicator function from equation (3.1) using data from the National Vital
Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age a in state s in year t. Control variables
include log of population, an indicator variable for age group, state fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects, and
time-varying state-level control variables. Dots display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of population. The vertical line
indicates 2004, the year in which the Medicare Drug Discount and Transitional Assistance Programs
began.
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Figure 3.3: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on cardiovascular
mortality at age 66, by race
(a) White cardiovascular deaths
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(b) Non-white cardiovascular deaths
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator variable and the indicator function from equation (3.1) using data from the National Vital
Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age a in state s in year t. Control variables
include log of population, an indicator variable for age group, state fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects, and
time-varying state-level control variables. Dots display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of population. The vertical line
indicates 2004, the year in which the Medicare Drug Discount and Transitional Assistance Programs
began.
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Figure 3.4: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on cardiovascular
mortality at age 66, by physician density
(a) States with high physicians per capita
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(b) States with low physicians per capita
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator variable and the indicator function from equation (3.1) using data from the National Vital
Statistics for states with above- and below-median physicians per capita, respectively. The physician
data are obtained from the Area Health Resource File. The dependent variable is the log of deaths
for age a in state s in year t. Control variables include log of population, an indicator variable
for age group, state fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects, and time-varying state-level control variables.
Dots display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by state. All regressions are
weighted by the square-root of population. The vertical line indicates 2004, the year in which the
Medicare Drug Discount and Transitional Assistance Programs began.
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Figure 3.5: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on total drug use, by
income
(a) Income < 100% FPL
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(b) 100% FPL  Income < 125% FPL
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(c) 125% FPL  Income < 200% FPL
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(d) 200% FPL  Income < 400% FPL
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Notes: Panels (a)-(e) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the individ-
ual’s income group, the elderly indicator variable, and the indicator function from equation (3.4)
using data from the 2001-2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys. The dependent variable is total
drug use. Dots display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by household ⇥ age
group. The regression employs the MEPS survey weights. The vertical line indicates 2004, the year
in which the transitional programs began.
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Figure 3.6: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on cardiovascular drug use,
by income
(a) Income < 100% FPL
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(b) 100% FPL  Income < 125% FPL
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(c) 125% FPL  Income < 200% FPL
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(d) 200% FPL  Income < 400% FPL
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Notes: Panels (a)-(e) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the in-
dividual’s income group, the elderly indicator variable, and the indicator function from equation
(3.4) using data from the 2001-2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys. The dependent variable
is cardiovascular drug use. Dots display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered
by household ⇥ age group. The regression employs the MEPS survey weights. The vertical line
indicates 2004, the year in which the transitional programs began.
83
CHAPTER 4
DRIVER LICENSING LAWS AND MORTALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM A REGRESSION DISCONTI-
NUITY DESIGN
Motor vehicle accidents kill 32,000 people per year in the United States and are the
leading cause of death for people under the age of 35 (CDC 2014; Sauber-Schatz
2016). Young drivers are especially at risk because they lack driving experience and
are prone to risky behaviors. Recognizing this, all states require drivers to be above a
minimum age. Many have also enacted Graduated Driving License (GDL) laws that
place nighttime driving and passenger restrictions on newly eligible drivers.
While it is widely acknowledged that driving eligibility increases mortality, the
precise magnitude of this e↵ect is not well known. Even less is known about whether
recent driving restrictions reduce the likelihood of motor vehicle fatalities. Identifying
this causal e↵ect is challenging because of confounding factors: eligible drivers are
older than ineligible drivers, and may be more likely to die in tra c accidents for
reasons unrelated to driving eligibility. For example, they may be more likely to
drink alcohol or to engage in other risky behaviors.
We overcome this obstacle by using a regression discontinuity design. We exploit
the fact that the minimum driving age creates stark di↵erences in the teenage driver
population on either side of the age cuto↵. We present evidence that gaining driving
eligibility leads to an immediate increase in mortality of 8 per 100,000 by comparing
death rates for teenagers just before and just after reaching their state’s minimum
driving age. This e↵ect is driven by an increase in motor vehicle deaths.
Next we investigate the e↵ectiveness of GDL laws using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences
regression discontinuity (DDRD) design. That is, we compare death rates for teenagers
around their state’s minimum driving age before and after the implementation of GDL
laws. We estimate that these laws reduced teenage mortality by 4 per 100,000.
To put these results in perspective, we calculate that the social cost of the mor-
This is joint work with Julian Reif.
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tality associated with gaining driving eligibility is $720 per capita. Applied to the
nation’s population of 16-year-olds, this implies an annual social cost of $3 billion.
Dee, Grabowski, and Morrisey (2005) estimate a reduction of “at least 5.6%”, on a
base of 29 per 100,000 attributable to GDL. This translates to a reduction of 1.624 per
100,000. One specification goes up to 19 percent, or 5.51 per 100,000. They employ
a di↵erence-in-di↵erences framework that compares changes in teenage (ages 15-17)
death rates among states that passed GDL laws to states that did not pass the laws.
They also employ a triple di↵erences approach that controls for contemporaneous
mortality in ages 18-20, ages 21-23, and ages 24-26.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
restricted-use mortality data. Section 3 describes the empirical method and presents
the main findings. Section 4 provides a discussion and Section 5 concludes the paper.
4.1 Data
We obtain restricted-use mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System
(NVSS) of the National Center for Health Statistics. These data include the universe
of all deaths that occurred in the United States for the years 1983-2014, and contain
information on the decedents’ cause of death, state of residence, and month and
year of birth. We construct age-specific death rates by combining these data with
population estimates from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)
Program of the National Cancer Institute.
Based on the cause-of-death information, we identify deaths due to external and
internal causes. Following Carpenter and Dobkin (2009), we create mutually exclu-
sive cause-of-death subcategories within deaths due to external causes: homicides,
suicides, motor vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related deaths, and other external deaths.
Table 4.1 shows death rates for teenagers aged 16-19 during the period of our
study. The total mortality rate is 80 per 100,000. The leading cause of death for
this age group is motor vehicle accidents (MVA), which is responsible for nearly 40
percent of all deaths. The next two largest categories are internal causes (e.g., heart
disease and cancer) and homicide.
Figure 4.1 displays trends in the total death rate and the MVA death rate over
time. The total death rate declined from about 90 to 55 per 100,000. The MVA death
rate also decreased, from about 39 to 15 per 100,000.
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4.2 Minimum Driving Age Laws and Mortality
We employ a parametric regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the e↵ect
of gaining eligibility to drive on mortality. Eligibility depends on age, our running
variable, and varies by state. We obtained data on minimum driving age laws from
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. These laws create stark di↵erences in the
teenage driver population on either side of the age cuto↵. Our empirical design uses
this variation to estimate the e↵ect of teenage driving on mortality.
We estimate our model using the following specification:
MORTast =  POSTast +  AGE
n
ast + (POSTast ⇥ AGEnast) + ✏ast (4.1)
The outcome variable MORTast is the average mortality rate at age a in months
from the driving age in state s in year t. In some of our specifications, we will
examine specific causes of death such as mortality due to motor vehicle accidents.
The variable POSTast is an indicator variable equal to one if age a is greater than or
equal to the minimum driving age in state s in year t.1 AGEnast is the age running
variable of polynomial order n.2 All regressions are weighted by the square-root of
the appropriate age-specific population. We cluster standard errors by state to allow
for serial correlation within states. The coe cient of interest is  , which captures the
discontinuity in mortality that occurs at the minimum driving age threshold.
The identifying assumption underlying our analysis is that assignment to either
side of the minimum driving age threshold is as good as random. This assumption
is very reasonable: age cannot be manipulated, and we do not su↵er from sample
selection bias because we observe the universe of deaths. Figure 4.2 shows the fraction
licensed drivers (either restricted or full driver licenses) for di↵erent ages among the
teenage population. We observe a fraction close to zero for individuals under 16 and
it increases to 0.4 for those aged 16, which is the minimum age for obtaining a license
in most states.
Figure 4.3 shows death rates by age relative to the minimum driving age, based
on the 1983-2014 data. The figure shows an increase in the overall mortality rate of
about 8 deaths per 100,000 in the month that teenagers become eligible to drive. This
1As we discuss later, the minimum driving age changes over time in some states.
2This variable is indexed by s and t because we have normalized it to be relative to the minimum
driving age in each state and year.
86
jump is visible in deaths categorized as external causes, but not in ones categorized
as internal causes.
Figure 4.4 pursues this point further by displaying death rates for di↵erent sub-
categories of external deaths: homicides, suicides, motor vehicle accidents, alcohol-
related causes, and other external causes. At the threshold, we observe a sharp in-
crease in mortality due to motor vehicle accidents, the most common cause of death
among teenagers, but no clear changes in mortality due to other subcategories of
external deaths.
We then break down the analysis by gender and race. Figure 4.5 shows death
rates due to external causes separately for males and females. Although di↵erent in
magnitude, mortality due to motor vehicle accidents exhibits a stark increase at the
minimum age threshold for both genders. In contrast, graphical evidence in Figure
4.6 shows that this jump in mortality at the threshold is mainly driven by whites.
Nonwhite mortality rates do not display a discontinuity at the threshold, however.
While our main specification includes all years from 1983 to 2014, it is possible
that the e↵ect of driving eligibility on mortality has changed over time. To address
this possibility, we divide the sample period into 1983-1994, 1995-2004, and 2005-
2014. Results, shown in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, suggest that becoming eligible to
drive does not have as much of an e↵ect on mortality during recent years 2005-2014
when compared to the earlier period 1983-1994 or 1995-2004.
Table 4.2 presents the regression estimates corresponding to the results displayed
in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Each row shows separate estimates for di↵erent causes of death.
Moving across columns reveals how estimates change as we increase the order of the
polynomial in our running variable. Column (2) estimates that driving eligibility
increases the total death rate by 2.99 deaths per 100,000. When compared to the
average death rate one year prior to reaching the driving age, displayed in Column
(5), this translates into an increase of 8 percent. This e↵ect is driven by an increase
in the motor vehicle death rate of of 4.19 deaths per 100,000, or 42 percent.
We next examine driving restrictions imposed on teenage drivers. Nearly all states
(= 49 states) implemented a night driving restriction or a passenger restriction (or
both) as part of the Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) system starting in the mid-
1990s. Figure 4.10 shows the number of states passing driving restrictions by year.
These laws prohibit teenage drivers from driving unsupervised during certain night-
time hours and from driving with more than a certain number of other teenage pas-
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sengers in the same vehicle at any time. Eight states also increased the minimum
driving age as part of their GDL system. We exclude those states from this part of
our analysis.
To estimate the e↵ect of night driving and passenger restrictions on mortality, we
compare the discontinuities in mortality for individuals on each side of the age cuto↵
before and after the implementation. We use an RD combined with a di↵erence-in-
di↵erences method (DDRD):
MORTast =  1POSTast +  2AGE
n
ast +  3(POSTast ⇥ AGEnast)
+  4(POSTast ⇥RESTRICTst) +  5(AGEnast ⇥RESTRICTst)
+  6(POSTast ⇥ AGEnast ⇥RESTRICTst) + ↵s +  t + ✏ast (4.2)
The outcome variableMORTast is the average mortality rate at age a in months from
the driving age in state s in year t. The variable RESTRICTst indicates the post-
period for state s following the implementation of night driving and/or passenger
restrictions. The remaining variables are defined as in equation (4.1). We fully
interact the age polynomial AGEnast with the above-MDA indicator POSTast and
post-period indicator RESTRICTst. The coe cient  4 on the interaction between
the above-MDA indicator and post-period indicator is an DDRD estimate of the
e↵ect of the driving restrictions on mortality. The model includes state fixed e↵ects
(↵s) to account for time-invariant state characteristics, and year fixed e↵ects ( t) to
account for secular changes in mortality over time. To allow for a su cient time for
the restrictions to become completely e↵ective, we exclude the implementation years
from our main analysis.
Figure 4.11 shows the age profile of overall mortality before and after the imple-
mentation of teenage driving restrictions. While there is an increase in total deaths
at the minimum driving age both before and after the implementation, the jump is
larger before the policy change. We examine this in detail by providing the age pro-
files of mortality due to external causes in Figure 4.12 and motor vehicle accidents in
Figure 4.13. Again, the jump in total mortality at the minimum driving age is mainly
driven by deaths due to external causes, which also exhibit a larger increase at the
driving age during the pre-implementation period (see Figure 4.12). As expected,
the observed e↵ect of the driving restrictions on mortality in Figure 4.13 is more
pronounced for motor vehicle fatalities and it shows a substantial di↵erence between
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the pre- and post-implementation increases in mortality at the driving age threshold.
Before moving on to the DDRD regression estimates, we replicate Table 4.2 using
the 41 states that added at least one of the two restrictions during 1995-2014 to allow
for a direct comparison between the RD and DDRD analyses. The RD results using
the 41 states and 2 states that did not pass these restrictions during the time period
are reported in Table 4.3. For teenage drivers, the quadratic specification shows that
driving is associated with an increase of 4.34 motor vehicle fatalities per 100,000, or
42 percent of the relevant mean death rate one year before the driving age.
Then in Table 4.4, we report estimates for the DDRD analysis from equation (4.2).
Our preferred quadratic specification in column (2) provides clear evidence that the
nighttime driving and passenger restrictions had a considerable e↵ect on deaths due
to motor vehicle accidents. In particular, the implementation of a nighttime driving
and/or a passenger restriction reduced motor vehicle fatalities by 3.68 per 100,000,
or 35 percent.
4.3 Discussion
We estimate that GDL laws reduced the annual teenage mortality rate by four per
hundred thousand. The social value of this mortality reduction depends on the value
of a statistical life for teenagers. A reasonable value for these individuals is $9 million
(2016 dollars).3 Readers who prefer a di↵erent value may adjust accordingly, since
our estimated benefit is linear in this value.
Applying this value to our empirical estimate yields an estimated annual health
benefit of $360 per capita. This does not include savings from reduced medical costs.
Alternatively, there are currently 4.2 million 16-year-olds alive in the United States.
Our estimates imply that exposing all of them to the GLD system would yield $1.5
billion in annual benefits. For the sake of comparison, Huh and Reif (2016) estimate
that the annual benefit of the mortality reduction associated with Medicare Part D
equals $5 billion.
Whether GDL laws are beneficial overall depends on the costs associated with
these programs. While we do not have any data on the direct costs associated with the
3Murphy and Topel (2006) estimate a value of $9 million (2016 dollars) for teenagers. Since the
life expectancy of a 16-year-old is 65 years (2013 Social Security life tables), this implies an average
value of a statistical life-year equal to $138,000 for these individuals.
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implementation of these program, we suspect that those costs are significantly lower
than the resulting mortality benefits above. However, there are also non-monetary
costs associated with these programs. For example, teenagers are prohibiting from
driving during nighttime hours and with certain types of passengers, which represents
a welfare loss.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that gaining driving eligibility causes a sharp jump in
overall mortality, driven by increased motor vehicle fatalities. We obtain a precise
magnitude of this e↵ect using a regression discontinuity design. We also find that
GDL laws can save lives by reducing the size of this increase in mortality at the
minimum driving age.
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4.5 Tables and figures
Table 4.1: Mortality rate for individuals aged 16-19, 1983-2014
Cause&of&Death Deaths&per&100,000
Overall 80.48
External 63.75
!!!!!!!MVA 30.26
!!!!!!!Suicide 10.25
!!!!!!!Homicide 13.28
!!!!!!!Alcohol8related 0.25
!!!!!!!Other!External 9.72
Internal 16.73
Notes: This shows death rates of individuals aged 16-19, using data from the 1983-2014 National
Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program. Deaths due to
external and internal causes are identified based on ICD-9 codes, following the same categorization
method as in Carpenter and Dobkin (2009).
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Table 4.2: E↵ect of gaining driving eligibility on mortality, all states, 1983-2014
Mean%of%the%
dependent%variable
(5)
Any$Cause$of$Death 12.34 *** 2.99 *** 6.05 *** 6.52 *** 36.74
(0.82) (0.82) (0.82) (0.77)
External$Causes 12.29 *** 3.03 *** 5.81 *** 5.90 *** 24.13
(0.77) (0.83) (0.81) (0.74)
$$$$$$$$$$MVA 9.77 *** 4.19 *** 5.34 *** 5.28 *** 10.00
(0.84) (0.73) (0.69) (0.61)
$$$$$$$$$$Suicide 0.96 *** 0.09 0.41 * 0.07 4.27
(0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.27)
$$$$$$$$$$Homicide 1.56 *** I0.83 *** 0.06 0.35 4.03
(0.29) (0.18) (0.18) (0.30)
$$$$$$$$$$AlcoholIrelated 0.05 *** 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
$$$$$$$$$$Other$External I0.06 I0.43 *** I0.02 0.13 5.77
(0.11) (0.14) (0.19) (0.24)
Internal$Causes 0.05 I0.04 0.24 0.62 12.61
(0.14) (0.17) (0.25) (0.39)
Observations 158,304 158,304 158,304 158,304
Mortality
Coefficient)on)POST
Linear%in%AGE Quadratic%in%AGE Cubic%in%AGE Quartic%in%AGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on POSTast from equation (4.1), using data from
the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)
Program. All states are included in the sample. The dependent variable is the average mortality
rate at age a in state s in year t. Each row corresponds to a separate regression for a specific cause
of death used as an outcome variable in equation (4.1). Columns (1)-(4) show how results change
as we increase the order of the polynomial in age. Column (5) shows the reference mean of the
dependent variable one year before reaching the minimum driving age. Standard errors, given in
parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of population.
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 4.3: E↵ect of gaining driving eligibility on mortality, 41 States that Implemented
Night Driving and/or Passenger Restrictions, 1983-2014
Mean%of%the%
dependent%variable
(5)
Any$Cause$of$Death 12.71 *** 3.14 *** 6.75 *** 7.06 *** 37.28
(0.94) (0.99) (0.78) (0.77)
External$Causes 12.50 *** 3.09 *** 6.43 *** 6.61 *** 24.85
(0.90) (0.98) (0.74) (0.72)
$$$$$$$$$$MVA 9.98 *** 4.34 *** 5.85 *** 5.98 *** 10.41
(0.95) (0.82) (0.69) (0.63)
$$$$$$$$$$Suicide 0.96 *** 0.07 0.40 0.05 4.47
(0.13) (0.16) (0.25) (0.31)
$$$$$$$$$$Homicide 1.55 *** I0.93 *** 0.10 0.31 4.20
(0.32) (0.17) (0.24) (0.37)
$$$$$$$$$$AlcoholIrelated 0.06 *** 0.02 0.04 0.11 *** 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
$$$$$$$$$$Other$External I0.04 I0.42 ** 0.04 0.16 5.68
(0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.30)
Internal$Causes 0.21 0.05 0.33 0.45 12.43
(0.15) (0.19) (0.28) (0.43)
Observations 117,758 117,758 117,758 117,758
Mortality
Coefficient)on)POST
Linear%in%AGE Quadratic%in%AGE Cubic%in%AGE Quartic%in%AGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on POSTast from equation (4.1), using data from
the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)
Program. The sample includes 41 states that added at least one of the two driving restrictions
and 2 states that did not pass any of these restrictions during 1983-2014. We exclude states that
increased the driving age simultaneously with these restrictions. The dependent variable is the
average mortality rate at age a in state s in year t. Each row corresponds to a separate regression
for a specific cause of death used as an outcome variable in equation (4.1). Columns (1)-(4) show
how results change as we increase the order of the polynomial in age. Column (5) shows the reference
mean of the dependent variable one year before reaching the minimum driving age. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of
population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table 4.4: Impact of Night Driving and/or Passenger Restrictions on Mortality,
1983-2014
Mean%of%the%
dependent%variable
(5)
Any$Cause$of$Death /10.52 *** /3.48 *** /3.03 ** /4.03 ** 37.28
(1.12) (1.07) (1.37) (1.57)
External$Causes /9.30 *** /3.23 *** /2.18 * /3.85 *** 24.85
(1.00) (1.00) (1.13) (1.26)
$$$$$$$$$$MVA /6.39 *** /3.68 *** /2.91 *** /3.62 *** 10.41
(0.58) (0.56) (0.83) (0.91)
$$$$$$$$$$Suicide /1.21 *** 0.16 0.34 /0.32 4.47
(0.27) (0.48) (0.64) (0.74)
$$$$$$$$$$Homicide /1.26 ** /0.13 /0.36 /0.92 ** 4.20
(0.54) (0.41) (0.36) (0.43)
$$$$$$$$$$Alcohol/related /0.04 0.01 /0.01 0.06 0.09
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
$$$$$$$$$$Other$External /0.41 ** 0.40 0.75 0.95 5.68
(0.18) (0.35) (0.50) (0.65)
Internal$Causes /1.22 *** /0.25 /0.85 /0.18 12.43
(0.31) (0.43) (0.68) (0.93)
Observations 117,758 117,758 117,758 117,758
Mortality
Coefficient)on)POST×RESTRICT
Linear%in%AGE Quadratic%in%AGE Cubic%in%AGE Quartic%in%AGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on POSTast ⇥ RESTRICTst from equation
(4.2), using data from the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and
End Results (SEER) Program. The sample includes 41 states that added at least one of the two
driving restrictions and 2 states that did not pass any of these restrictions during 1983-2014. We
exclude states that increased the driving age simultaneously with these restrictions. The dependent
variable is the average mortality rate at age a in state s in year t. Each row corresponds to a separate
regression for a specific cause of death used as an outcome variable in equation (4.2). Columns (1)-
(4) show how results change as we increase the order of the polynomial in age. Column (5) shows
the reference mean of the dependent variable one year before reaching the minimum driving age
(from Table 4.3). Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are
weighted by the square-root of population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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Figure 4.1: Aggregate trends in teenage (ages 16-19) mortality rate
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
De
at
hs
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Year
All MVA
Notes: Figure shows trends in overall and MVA death rates of individuals aged 16-19, using data from
the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)
Program.
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Figure 4.2: Fraction of teenage licensed drivers
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Notes: Figure shows the fraction of teenage drivers with restricted or full driver li-
censes during 1983-2014. Source: Federal Highway Administration, combined with
data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program. See
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/quickfinddata/qfdrivers.cfm for details.
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Figure 4.3: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA), 1983-2014
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Notes: Figure shows death rates by age, relative to the minimum driving age (MDA), using data from
the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)
Program. All states are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from a regression with a
quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator. Two cause-of-death
categories are identified based on ICD-9 codes: deaths due to external and internal causes.
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Figure 4.4: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) for
di↵erent external causes of death, 1983-2014
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Notes: Figure shows death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum driving age
(MDA), using data from the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) Program. All states are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from
a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator.
Subcategories within external deaths are identified based on ICD-9 codes: homicides, suicides, motor
vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related deaths, and other external deaths.
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Figure 4.5: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) for
di↵erent external causes of death, by gender, 1983-2014
(a) Male
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(b) Female
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum
driving age (MDA), using data from the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epi-
demiology, and End Results (SEER) Program. The panels show results separately by gender. All
states are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from a regression with a quadratic polyno-
mial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator. Subcategories within external deaths
are identified based on ICD-9 codes: homicides, suicides, motor vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related
deaths, and other external deaths.
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Figure 4.6: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) for
di↵erent external causes of death, by race, 1983-2014
(a) White
0
10
20
30
40
De
at
hs
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
-48 -42 -36 -30 -24 -18 -12 -6 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
Age (in months) since MDA
Homicide Suicide
MVA Alcohol
Other external
(b) Nonwhite
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum
driving age (MDA), using data from the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epi-
demiology, and End Results (SEER) Program. The panels show results separately by race. All states
are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age
fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator. Subcategories within external deaths are identified
based on ICD-9 codes: homicides, suicides, motor vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related deaths, and other
external deaths.
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Figure 4.7: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) for
di↵erent external causes of death, 1983-1994
0
10
20
30
40
50
De
at
hs
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
-48 -42 -36 -30 -24 -18 -12 -6 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
Age (in months) since MDA
Homicide Suicide
MVA Alcohol
Other external
Notes: Figure shows death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum driving age
(MDA), using data from the 1983-1994 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) Program. All states are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from
a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator.
Subcategories within external deaths are identified based on ICD-9 codes: homicides, suicides, motor
vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related deaths, and other external deaths.
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Figure 4.8: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) for
di↵erent external causes of death, 1995-2004
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Notes: Figure shows death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum driving age
(MDA), using data from the 1995-2004 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) Program. All states are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from
a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator.
Subcategories within external deaths are identified based on ICD-9 codes: homicides, suicides, motor
vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related deaths, and other external deaths.
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Figure 4.9: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) for
di↵erent external causes of death, 2005-2014
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Notes: Figure shows death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum driving age
(MDA), using data from the 2005-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) Program. All states are included in the sample. The fitted lines are from
a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator.
Subcategories within external deaths are identified based on ICD-9 codes: homicides, suicides, motor
vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related deaths, and other external deaths.
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Figure 4.10: Number of states passing driving restrictions by year
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Notes: Figure shows the number of states passing a night driving restriction or a passenger restriction
(or both) by year during 1995-2014. In total, 49 states implemented at least one of these two
driving restrictions during our sample period. Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. See
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/graduatedlicenseintro?topicName=teenagers for details.
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Figure 4.11: Changes in the mortality rate at the minimum driving age (MDA) before
and after teenage driving restrictions
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Notes: Figure shows death rates by age, relative to the minimum driving age (MDA), before and
after the implementation of night driving and/or passenger restrictions, using data from the 1983-
2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program.
The sample includes 41 states that added at least one of the two driving restrictions and 2 states that
did not pass any of these restrictions during 1983-2014. We exclude states that increased the driving
age simultaneously with these restrictions. The fitted lines are from a regression with a quadratic
polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator and post-implementation indicator.
105
Figure 4.12: Changes in the externally-caused death rate at the minimum driving age
(MDA) before and after teenage driving restrictions
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Notes: Figure shows death rates due to external causes by age, relative to the minimum driving
age (MDA), before and after the implementation of night driving and/or passenger restrictions,
using data from the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End
Results (SEER) Program. The sample includes 41 states that added at least one of the two driving
restrictions and 2 states that did not pass any of these restrictions during 1983-2014. We exclude
states that increased the driving age simultaneously with these restrictions. The fitted lines are from
a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA indicator and
post-implementation indicator. External causes of death are identified based on ICD-9 codes.
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Figure 4.13: Changes in the motor vehicle accident death rate at the minimum driving
age, before and after teenage driving restrictions
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Notes: Figure shows death rates due to motor vehicle accidents by age, relative to the minimum
driving age (MDA), before and after the implementation of night driving and/or passenger restric-
tions, using data from the 1983-2014 National Vital Statistics and Surveillance, Epidemiology, and
End Results (SEER) Program. The sample includes 41 states that added at least one of the two
driving restrictions and 2 states that did not pass any of these restrictions during 1983-2014. We
exclude states that increased the driving age simultaneously with these restrictions. The fitted lines
are from a regression with a quadratic polynomial in age fully interacted with the above-MDA in-
dicator and post-implementation indicator. Motor vehicle accidents are identified based on ICD-9
codes.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Robustness check
I check the robustness of my findings for Medicaid expansions presented in the main
text using equation (2.3). I provide estimates based on a set of alternative specifica-
tions. Results in Table A.1 use a continuous poverty rate variable instead of a binary
measure. In Table A.2, I use dentist counts per 100,000 population as the outcome
variable instead of the log of the variable. Table A.3 shows results where a shorter
time period 2009-2012, instead of 2006-2013, is used in the analysis. In addition, for
the sake of completeness, Table A.4 provides the unweighted estimates from equation
(2.3). While slightly di↵ering in magnitude, these results are all consistent with those
obtained using the main specification.
In Table A.5, I provide estimates from equation (2.3) where I control for county
fixed e↵ects instead of state fixed e↵ects. The estimates are similar to those obtained
with state fixed e↵ects. This shows that my main findings are not driven by time-
invariant county characteristics. In Table A.6, I report results using county-level
clusters to address the potential problems associated with having too few clusters.
This clustering gives nearly identical standard errors as in the main text.
As part of a placebo exercise, I estimate equation (2.3) using alternative pre- and
post-expansion years selected from 2006-2010, the period before the actual expan-
sions. I do not find any significant e↵ects in this placebo exercise (Table A.7). In
Table A.8, I repeat the basic di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences test of means us-
ing primary care physicians, and provide additional evidence to support the common
trends assumption discussed in the main text. In particular, both “within-treatment”
and “within-control” di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates for physicians are statistically
insignificant. This was, indeed, expected because all Medicaid expansions examined
in this paper were targeted specifically at dental coverage. I then estimate equation
(2.3) using the supply of primary care physicians as the outcome variable, instead
of dentists. Results reported in column (1) of Table A.9 suggest no e↵ect of the
expansions on physician supply. Finally, columns (2) and (3) of Table A.9 present
estimates where I put in variables related to economic conditions as the outcome vari-
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able: unemployment rate and per capita income. The latter placebo exercise confirms
that poor counties in the expansion states were not experiencing a major, unrelated
improvement in their economic conditions during the post-expansion period.
Table A.1: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentist, using a continuous measure of poverty
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.000 0.004 ** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.008 * 0.005 0.027 * 0.006 0.026 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009)
(Post11)*(Expansion) =0.038 =0.043 =0.011 =0.038 =0.041
(0.031) (0.027) (0.056) (0.031) (0.081)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.008 *** 0.004 *** 0.006 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
(Poverty) =0.011 *** =0.010 *** =0.017 ** =0.011 *** =0.011
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)
State?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County=level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State=level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
Full'Sample Dentist'Type Practice'Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. A continuous poverty
rate variable is used instead of a binary measure. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups
of dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the
12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make
changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state.
Regressions are weighted by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.2: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, using dentists per capita as the outcome variable
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 2.93 ** 2.42 ** 0.52 2.05 ** 0.89
(1.11) (0.92) (0.36) (0.87) (0.78)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 2.53 0.86 1.67 2.25 0.28
(4.21) (2.90) (1.62) (3.37) (1.18)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 0.87 * 0.82 * 0.05 1.34 ** =0.47
(0.50) (0.43) (0.17) (0.65) (0.35)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 1.66 * 1.31 * 0.35 1.62 ** 0.03
(0.89) (0.71) (0.31) (0.72) (0.51)
(Poverty) =1.71 =1.43 =0.28 =2.08 0.36
(2.20) (1.78) (0.77) (1.48) (0.88)
State?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County=level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State=level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent'variable:'Dentists'per'100,000'population
Full'Sample Dentist'Type Practice'Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Associ-
ation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The outcome variable is
the number of dentists per 100,000 population. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups
of dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the
12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make
changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state.
Regressions are weighted by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.3: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, using 2009-2012
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.12 0.09 *** 0.14 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) :0.01 :0.04 0.16 0.00 0.11
(0.08) (0.05) (0.25) (0.07) (0.20)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 0.04 *** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
(Poverty) :0.15 *** :0.13 *** :0.29 *** :0.16 *** :0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11)
State?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County:level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State:level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,600 9,600 9,600 9,600 9,600
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
Full'Sample Dentist'Type Practice'Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2009-2012. The sample period is
restricted to 2009-2012. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column
corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded
adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits
during 2009-2012. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are
weighted by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at
5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.4: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, unweighted
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.16 *** 0.14 ** 0.11 * 0.15 ** 0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.06 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.20
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12)
(Post11)*(Expansion) ;0.04 ;0.03 0.00 ;0.03 ;0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.06 ** 0.06 0.07 * 0.04 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
(Poverty) ;0.32 *** ;0.30 *** ;0.35 *** ;0.29 *** ;0.29 ***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05)
State?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County;level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State;level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
Full'Sample Dentist'Type Practice'Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the unweighted DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American
Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Columns (2)-
(5) show the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression.
The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011
and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given
in parentheses, are clustered by state. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. ***
Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.5: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, using county fixed e↵ects
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.02 0.09 *** 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) :0.08 :0.10 ** 0.11 :0.07 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 :0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
(Post11)*(Poverty) :0.01 :0.02 0.04 :0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
(Expansion) 0.00 0.01 :0.01 :0.02 0.15
(0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18)
(Poverty) :0.02 :0.01 :0.16 ** :0.02 :0.08
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
County@fixed@effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year@fixed@effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County:level@controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State:level@controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
Full'Sample Dentist'Type Practice'Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Associ-
ation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Columns (2)-(5) show the
estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. Regressions
include county fixed e↵ects instead of state fixed e↵ects. The sample includes 37 states: the 12
states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make
changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state.
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.6: Triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions on the
supply of dentists, using county-level clusters
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.12 ** 0.13 *** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.08
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.11)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) :0.01 :0.05 0.26 :0.02 0.18
(0.07) (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 ** :0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.07 *** 0.06 ** 0.13 *** 0.07 ** 0.10 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
(Poverty) :0.16 *** :0.13 *** :0.32 *** :0.16 *** :0.20 **
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
State?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year?fixed?effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County:level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State:level?controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186 19,186
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
Full'Sample Dentist'Type Practice'Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Columns (2)-(5) show
the estimates by subgroups of dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. The
sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and
the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in
parentheses, are clustered by county. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. ***
Significant at 1 percent.
114
Table A.7: Placebo: triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions
on the supply of dentists, using alternative pre- and post-expansion years from 2006-2010
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 30.03 0.01 30.01 30.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.02 30.01 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 0.02 * 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(Poverty) 30.18 *** 30.16 *** 30.17 *** 30.17 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
State>fixed>effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year>fixed>effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County3level>controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State3level>controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,980 11,980 11,980 11,980
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent'variable:'ln(Dentists'per'100,000'population)
2006,'''''''''''''
2007=2010
2006=2007,'
2008=2010
2006=2008,'
2009=2010
2006=2009,'
2010
Pre=period,'Post=period
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2010. Alternative years are
selected from 2006-2010 as the pre- and post-expansion periods. Each column corresponds to a sep-
arate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental
benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard
errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square root of
the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1
percent.
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Table A.8: Cross tabulation of the average number of primary care physicians per
100,000 population
Period Poverty*rate*<*20% Poverty*rate*≥*20% Difference*by*poverty
Pre7expansion*period*(200672010) 108.03 73.34 734.70
(1.76) (2.78) (3.33)
[3,809] [923] [4,732]
Post7expansion*period*(201172013) 107.64 82.29 725.35
(3.05) (4.01) (4.96)
[2,050] [803] [2,853]
Difference*by*time 70.39 8.95 9.35
(3.55) (5.11) (6.07)
[5,859] [1,726] [7,585]
Pre7expansion*period*(200672010) 119.23 80.12 739.11
(8.71) (3.80) (8.18)
[5,486] [1,762] [7,248]
Post7expansion*period*(201172013) 119.63 87.02 732.61
(9.76) (5.55) (10.20)
[2,972] [1,381] [4,353]
Difference*by*time 0.39 6.90 6.50
(1.86) (2.88) (4.25)
[8,458] [3,143] [11,601]
DDD*Estimate 2.84
(5.25)
[19,186]
Panel&A.&Treatment&states&with&Medicaid&coverage&expansions
Panel&B.&Control&states&with&no&change&in&Medicaid&coverage
Notes: This table shows the average number of primary care physicians per 100,000 population using
the Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Each cell corresponds to the identified subset of the
sample. Panel A contains the 12 treatment states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in
2011. Panel B contains the 25 control states that did not change dental benefits during 2006-2013.
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state, and sample sizes are given in square
brackets. In Panel A, a bootstrap procedure is applied as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller (2008), using 500 bootstrap resamples.
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Table A.9: Placebo: triple di↵erence (DDD) e↵ect of adult Medicaid dental expansions
on alternative outcomes
Independent'variables
(Post11)*(Expansion)*(Poverty) 30.03 30.11 0.00
(0.07) (0.16) (0.02)
(Expansion)*(Poverty) 0.29 0.19 30.01
(0.19) (0.22) (0.04)
(Post11)*(Expansion) 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
(Post11)*(Poverty) 0.13 *** 0.44 *** 0.09 ***
(0.03) (0.14) (0.02)
(Poverty) 30.14 0.34 * 30.22 ***
(0.08) (0.19) (0.03)
State>fixed>effects Yes Yes Yes
Year>fixed>effects Yes Yes Yes
County3level>controls Yes Yes Yes
State3level>controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,186 19,186 19,186
Economic'conditions
Unemployment'
rate
ln(Per'capita'
income)
(2) (3)
ln(Physicians'
per'100,000)
(1)
Notes: This table shows the DDD estimates from equation (2.3) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Alternative outcomes
are estimated: log private primary care physicians per 100,000 population and two variables related
to economic conditions, county-level unemployment rate and log per capita income. Each column
corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 37 states: the 12 states that expanded
adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011 and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits
during 2006-2013. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are
weighted by the square root of the county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at
5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
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A.2 Di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach
In this section, I examine the impact of Medicaid policy changes on the supply of
dentists using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) framework. I exploit variation in adult
Medicaid dental benefits across states and over time.1 Using this quasi-experimental
policy variation, I compare the change in dentist counts per capita in the treatment
states to that in the control states before and after 2011.
This specification relies on di↵erent assumptions than the DDD model. My main
identifying assumption here is that trends in the supply of dentists would have been
similar for the treatment states and the control states in the absence of the changes
in adult Medicaid dental benefits. As explained previously, however, the identifying
assumption is unlikely to hold because states’ decisions to expand or reduce Medicaid
benefits are more often than not correlated with their economic conditions or other
confounding factors. Nevertheless, I conduct the DD analysis and compare its results
to those in the main text.
Again, I start with an event-study specification to capture heterogeneous e↵ects
of adult Medicaid dental coverage over time. I estimate the following equation:
Yct =  Expansions +
2013X
t=2006,t 6=2010
 t ⇤ Expansions ⇤ 1(Y eart)
+Xct 1 + Zst 2 + ↵s ⇤ 1(States) +  t ⇤ 1(Y eart) + ✏ct (A.1)
The outcome variable is the log of the number of dentists per 100,000 population in
county c in year t. The coe cients of interest are the  t’s on the two-way interaction
between Expansions and year fixed e↵ects 1(Y eart). The variable Expansions rep-
resents the treatment group and it is equal to 1 for the expansion states, -1 for the
reduction states, and 0 for the control states.2 The remaining variables are defined
as in equation (2.2). I control for a full set of state and year fixed e↵ects. Included
in Xct and Zst are county- and state-level covariates, respectively, that may a↵ect
the supply of dentists. I control for the same set of covariates as in equation (2.2).
Regressions are weighted by the square root of the county’s population, and standard
errors are clustered by state.
1This model does not account for heterogeneous treatment e↵ects of the policy changes by poverty.
2Note that Expansions will be absorbed by state fixed e↵ects and so there is no need to include
this separately when estimating the equation.
118
As with my main DDD analysis, I then constrain the treatment e↵ects to be
constant in the periods before and after Medicaid policy changes in 2011. I assign
2006-2010 as the pre-period and 2011-2013 as the post-period. My estimating equa-
tion then becomes:
Yct =  Expansions +  Post11t ⇤ Expansions
+Xct 1 + Zst 2 + ↵s ⇤ 1(States) +  t ⇤ 1(Y eart) + ✏ct (A.2)
The variables are defined as in equation (A.1). The coe cient of interest is   on the
interaction Post11t ⇤ Expansions, where Post11t indicates the post-period.
Figure A.1 plots the DD estimates from equation (A.1). Graphical evidence sug-
gests that dentists per capita in the treatment states relative to the control states
bounce around slightly below the zero mark during 2006-2010 and then increase
sharply in 2011 and onward. There is no strong evidence of pre-trends in the fig-
ure. I then present results separately by specialty and practice type in Figure A.2.
Across all four subgroups of dentists, I observe similar patterns where the supply of
dentists in the treatment states stays fairly constant relative to the control states in
the pre-period before it starts increasing in 2011. The size of the implied e↵ects of 2
to 3 percent in these figures is smaller than what I observed in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 for
the DDD analysis, however, because now the e↵ects are averaged across counties. Yet,
scaling the estimates by the fraction of poor counties (= 21 percent) in the treatment
states yields results larger than those from the DDD specification.
In Table A.10, I provide results from equation (A.2) for the full sample and sub-
groups of dentists by dentist type and practice type. The second column of Table
A.10, where all county- and state-level controls are included, shows that per capita
dentists in the treatment states increased by 3 percent, when compared to the control
states, as a result of the policy changes. Scaling by the fraction of poor counties
implies an increase of 14 percent. This translates into almost 5 dentists per 100,000
population based on their pre-2011 mean levels the treatment states. Results across
the subgroups of dentists match the changing patterns of dentists’ supply shown in
the figures. Each subgroup experienced a scaled increase of 14 to 19 percent in the
treatment states relative to the control states during the post-2011 period. These
results are larger than, but consistent with my main findings.
I then examine the expansions and reductions separately. Results, reported in
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Table A.11, overall suggest that the main e↵ects are driven by the expansions. This
is consistent with the DDD analysis. The expansions resulted in an increase in per
capita dentists by 13 percent when scaled by the corresponding fraction of poor
counties.3 The estimate implies about 4 more dentists per 100,000 population in the
expansion states when compared to the control states. This increase in dentist supply
extends to all subgroups of dentists, except for public practitioners.
The DD analysis overall yields estimates that are, if anything, slightly greater than
those obtained using the main specification. This is in line with the concern that the
expansions were not random. Rather, states expanded Medicaid benefits because they
were expecting better budget situations. These favorable economic conditions could
have brought dentists to the expansion states even in the absence of the expansions.
My main DDD analysis addresses this concern and shows the impact of the expansions
on the supply of dentists that is not biased by the potential confounding factors.
3The fraction of poor counties in the expansion states in my sample is 22.7 percent.
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Table A.11: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) e↵ect of changes in adult Medicaid dental
coverage on the supply of dentists, expansion or reduction
Expansion)Effect)(+expansion) 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.04 * 0.04 ** 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Reduction)Effect)(;expansion) ;0.02 ;0.02 ;0.02 ;0.01 ;0.09 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
State)fixed)effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year)fixed)effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County;level)controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State;level)controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,914 21,914 21,914 21,914 21,914
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient0on0(Post11)*(Expansion)
Full0Sample Dentist0Type Practice0Type
Generalist Specialist Private Public
Notes: This table shows the DD estimates from equation (A.2) using the American Dental Asso-
ciation’s Dentist Masterfile and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The expansion and
reduction e↵ects are estimated separately. Columns (2)-(5) show the estimates by subgroups of
dentists. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes 42 states: the 12
states that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits in
2011, and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the
county population. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1
percent.
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Figure A.1: Event-study plot of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) e↵ect of changes in
adult Medicaid dental coverage on the supply of dentists, expansion and reduction
combined
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Notes: This figure shows estimates of the coe cient on the two-way interaction between Expansions
and year fixed e↵ects from equation (A.1) using the American Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile
and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The sample includes 42 states: the 12 states that
expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits in 2011, and
the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. The vertical line indicates
2010, the year before Medicaid policy changes occurred. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered by state and regressions are weighted by the square root of the county
population.
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Figure A.2: Event-study plot of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) e↵ect of changes in
adult Medicaid dental coverage on the supply of dentists, by dentist type and practice type
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(b) Specialists
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(c) Private
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(d) Public
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Notes: Panels show estimates of the coe cient on the two-way interaction between Expansions and
year fixed e↵ects from equation (A.1) using the American Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile
and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. Panels (a) and (b) show the results by dentist type.
Panels (c) and (d) show the results by practice type. The sample includes 42 states: the 12 states
that expanded adult Medicaid dental benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits in 2011,
and the 25 states that did not make changes to benefits during 2006-2013. The vertical line indicates
2010, the year before Medicaid policy changes occurred. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered by state and regressions are weighted by the square root of the county
population.
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Figure A.3: Event-study plot of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) e↵ect of changes in
adult Medicaid dental coverage on the supply of dentists, expansion or reduction
(a) Expansion
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(b) Reduction
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Notes: Panels show estimates of the coe cient on the two-way interaction between Expansions and
year fixed e↵ects from equation (A.1) using the American Dental Association’s Dentist Masterfile
and Area Health Resources Files for 2006-2013. The expansion and reduction e↵ects are estimated
separately. The sample includes 42 states: the 12 states that expanded adult Medicaid dental
benefits in 2011, the 5 states that reduced benefits in 2011, and the 25 states that did not make
changes to benefits during 2006-2013. The vertical line indicates 2010, the year before Medicaid
policy changes occurred. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by
state and regressions are weighted by the square root of the county population.
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Data Appendix
The four most drug-intensive diseases, as defined by Table 3.2, are heart disease,
digestive system diseases, diabetes, and lipid metabolism disorders. Table B.1 displays
the three most commonly prescribed medications in the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey for these four diseases. The last column shows what fraction of the total drug
use for a specific disease corresponds to a particular drug. For example, Atorvastatin
accounts for 34 percent of all drug prescriptions for lipid metabolism disorders.
Table B.1: Top three drug treatments for common medical conditions
Drugname Primarymedicaluse Fractionofcategory
Heartdisease
METOPROLOL Hypertension,chestpain,heartattack 8.3%
LISINOPRIL Hypertension,heartfailure,heartattack,kidneydisease 7.3%
ATENOLOL Hypertension,heartpain,heartattack 6.4%
Digestivediseases
OMEPRAZOLE Indigestion,stomachulcers,acidreflux 15.9%
LANSOPRAZOLE Stomachulcers,acidreflux 13.7%
ESOMEPRAZOLE Indigestion,stomachulcers,acidreflux 12.0%
Diabetes
METFORMIN Type2diabetes 16.7%
GLIPIZIDE Type2diabetes 9.0%
GLYBURIDE Type2diabetes 8.9%
Lipidmetabolismdisorders
ATORVASTATIN Highcholesterol,cardiovasculardiseaseprevention 33.9%
SIMVASTATIN Highcholesterol,cardiovasculardiseaseprevention 21.8%
LOVASTATIN Highcholesterol,cardiovasculardiseaseprevention 6.1%
Notes: This table lists the three most commonly prescribed drugs for four di↵erent diseases frequently
treated with prescription medication using data from the 2001-2008 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey. The last column reports what fraction of total prescriptions for the disease category is
represented by a particular drug.
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B.2 Robustness checks
Table B.2 presents results when we use the per capita mortality rate as the outcome
variable instead of the log of deaths. Column (1) of the table estimates that Medicare
Part D reduced mortality among 66-year-olds relative to 64-year-olds by 30.07 per
100,000, and cardiovascular mortality by 22.23 per 100,000. These correspond to
reductions of 1.8 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively, which is very similar to the
estimates of 2.2 and 4.4 percent that are presented in the main text. Columns (2)-(5)
show analogous results when we estimate this model separately by gender and race.
Again, the results are very similar to those presented in the main text.
Table B.3 displays estimates when we employ 65-year-olds as the treatment group
instead of 66-year-olds. Because 65-year-olds have been exposed to Medicare Part
D for only six months on average, we expect them to be less a↵ected by Medicare
Part D. We continue to find a statistically significant e↵ect for cardiovascular and
total mortality in the full sample, although the point estimates are attenuated, as
expected. Estimates are again larger for males and non-whites, although the latter
are statistically insignificant due to the attenuation and the large standard errors.
Table B.4 displays estimates using all pairwise combinations of control and treat-
ment from the 61-69 age range. We do not include these estimates in the main text
because the di↵erences in age between treatment and control are larger than our
primary specification (2=66-64), which potentially compromises our main identify-
ing assumption. Nevertheless, we report these estimates here to show that there is
nothing unique about our particular treatment and control groups. Moreover, the
estimates in Table B.4 suggest that the treatment e↵ect may be larger for older
Medicare beneficiaries.
As a placebo exercise, we estimate our main specification using di↵erent combi-
nations of ages drawn from the under-65 population. The results for all-cause and
cardiovascular mortality are reported in Tables B.5 and B.6. Across all sixty of these
regressions, we find only four (marginally) significant e↵ects.
A second placebo exercise employs deaths due to external causes as the dependent
variable. We estimate an event-study regression and plot the results in Figure B.1.
As expected, there does not appear to be any e↵ect for this category of deaths.1
1We also estimated a regression model that constrains the treatment e↵ect to be constant dur-
ing 2005-2008. It confirms that the estimated treatment e↵ect for external causes is statistically
insignificant.
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Next, we expand our pre- and post-period by four years each. This makes use of
the most recent data available from the National Vital Statistics System. This larger
sample size increases precision, but risks introducing bias because this specification
may capture other events that might di↵erentially a↵ect 64- and 66-year-olds. Figure
B.2 displays event-study plots for this expanded time period. The plots suggest
that there may have been short-term di↵erential changes in mortality during the late
1990’s and again around 2009. The former may be due to the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, which cut Medicare spending, and the latter may be due to the Great
Recession.2 However, Table B.7 shows that our main di↵erence-in-di↵erences results
are not substantively a↵ected when we include these additional years in our estimation
sample.
Finally, Table B.8 displays estimates when we limit our sample to the years 2002-
2007. This smaller sample size reduces precision, but may also reduce bias, for the
same reasons mentioned previously. In any case, both Table B.7 and Table B.8 report
a statistically significant decline in the relative mortality of the young-elderly for all
causes and for cardiovascular diseases in particular. We never find a significant e↵ect
for cancer mortality, either in the full sample or for subgroups, in either specification.
Additional specifications (not reported) that include or exclude di↵ering numbers of
years yield similar results.
2Although elderly mortality has historically been procyclical, McInerney and Mellor (2012) show
that it becomes countercyclial beginning in 1994, which is consistent with our estimates.
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Table B.2: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66, using death rates as an
alternative outcome variable
Any$Cause$of$Death /30.07 ** /53.27 ** /11.73 /27.03 * /55.23 *
(10.79) (17.25) (11.03) (11.00) (27.19)
Cardiovascular /22.23 ** /31.75 ** /14.89 ** /20.19 ** /39.41 *
(6.32) (11.63) (4.44) (6.05) (14.74)
Cancer /0.30 /3.88 2.06 2.27 /14.95
(5.56) (9.59) (6.41) (5.61) (15.60)
Other /4.05 /9.11 0.16 /6.19 5.93
(4.87) (7.77) (6.05) (4.93) (14.40)
State$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent-variable
Coefficient-on-Post05*Elderly
Full-sample Gender Race
Male Female White NonGwhite
(1)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 2001-2008 National
Vital Statistics. The dependent variable is the death rate per 100,000 population for age group a in
state s in year t. The average total death rate and cardiovascular death rate for 66-year-olds between
2001 and 2004 are 1,629 and 521 per 100,000, respectively. Each row and column corresponds to
a separate regression for a specific cause of death used as an outcome variable in equation (3.2).
The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51). Standard errors, given in
parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of population.
* Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.3: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 65
Any$Cause$of$Death /0.017 * /0.025 ** /0.005 /0.016 * /0.017
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.015)
Cardiovascular /0.026 * /0.040 ** 0.001 /0.023 * /0.025
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.020)
Cancer 0.001 0.005 /0.004 0.002 /0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.026)
Other /0.020 /0.034 * /0.003 /0.023 * /0.004
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.024)
State$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent-variable
Coefficient-on-Post05*Elderly
Full-sample Gender Race
Male Female White NonGwhite
(1)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 2001-2008 National
Vital Statistics. It employs 65-year-olds as the treatment group instead of 66-year-olds (the primary
specification in the main text). The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age group a in state
s in year t. Each row and column corresponds to a separate regression for a specific cause of death
used as an outcome variable in equation (3.2). The number of observations in each regression is equal
to 816 (=8*2*51). Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are
weighted by the square-root of population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.4: E↵ect of Part D on mortality, using di↵erent ages for treatment and control
Age
Control*X*Treatment
64#X#69 &0.040 ** &0.065 ** &0.002 &0.053 **
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
63#X#69 &0.046 ** &0.076 ** &0.013 &0.048 **
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
62#X#69 &0.034 * &0.082 ** 0.017 &0.041 *
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
61#X#69 &0.030 ** &0.056 ** 0.011 &0.038 *
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
64#X#68 &0.053 ** &0.081 ** &0.021 &0.056 **
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
63#X#68 &0.055 ** &0.089 ** &0.022 &0.053 **
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
62#X#68 &0.049 ** &0.098 ** 0.000 &0.051 **
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
61#X#68 &0.037 ** &0.065 ** 0.004 &0.043 *
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
64#X#67 &0.042 ** &0.067 ** &0.022 * &0.041 **
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
63#X#67 &0.048 ** &0.081 ** &0.031 * &0.037 *
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
62#X#67 &0.038 ** &0.086 ** &0.005 &0.030
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
61#X#67 &0.034 ** &0.060 ** &0.005 &0.032 *
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.016)
64#X#66 &0.022 ** &0.044 ** &0.002 &0.022
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
63#X#66 &0.016 * &0.044 ** 0.004 &0.010
(0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
62#X#66 &0.011 &0.053 ** 0.023 &0.006
(0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
61#X#66 &0.011 &0.037 * 0.019 * &0.009
(0.006) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015)
State#fixed#effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year#fixed#effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coefficient*on*Post05*Elderly
Any*Cause Cardiovascular Cancer Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 2001-2008 National
Vital Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age group a in state s in year t.
Each row and column corresponds to a separate regression for a specific cause of death used as an
outcome variable in equation (3.2) and a specific pair of ages used for the control and treatment
groups. The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51). Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root of
population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.5: Placebo exercise: e↵ect of Medicare Part D on all-cause mortality
Age
Control*X*Treatment
63#X#64 0.002 0.008 *0.006 0.002 *0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015)
62#X#64 0.009 0.019 * *0.003 0.006 0.020
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.020)
61#X#64 0.012 0.020 * 0.003 0.011 0.017
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.016)
62#X#63 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.021
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015)
61#X#63 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.021
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012)
61#X#62 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016)
State#fixed#effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year#fixed#effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coefficient*on*Post05*Elderly
Full*sample Gender Race
Male Female White NonCwhite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: This table shows results of the placebo exercises using data from the 2001-2008 National Vital
Statistics. Instead of employing age 64 as the control group and age 66 as the treatment group,
it employs di↵erent combinations of ages from the under-65 population, which was not a↵ected by
the implementation of Medicare Part D. The dependent variable is the log of all-cause deaths for
age group a in state s in year t. Each row and column corresponds to a separate regression in
equation (3.2). The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51). Standard
errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root
of population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.6: Placebo exercise: e↵ect of Medicare Part D on cardiovascular mortality
Age
Control*X*Treatment
63#X#64 &0.007 0.009 &0.033 &0.015 0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.023)
62#X#64 &0.014 &0.004 &0.030 &0.020 &0.001
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.030)
61#X#64 0.004 0.023 * &0.029 0.000 0.017
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.028)
62#X#63 &0.008 &0.013 0.002 &0.005 &0.017
(0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.011) (0.023)
61#X#63 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.024)
61#X#62 0.019 0.028 * 0.001 0.019 0.021
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.025)
State#fixed#effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year#fixed#effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient*on*Post05*Elderly
Full*sample Gender Race
Male Female White NonIwhite
Notes: This table shows results of the placebo exercises using data from the 2001-2008 National Vital
Statistics. Instead of employing age 64 as the control group and age 66 as the treatment group,
it employs di↵erent combinations of ages from the under-65 population, which was not a↵ected by
the implementation of Medicare Part D. The dependent variable is the log of cardiovascular deaths
for age group a in state s in year t. Each row and column corresponds to a separate regression in
equation (3.2). The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51). Standard
errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root
of population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.7: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66, using data from 1997-2012
Any$Cause$of$Death /0.017 ** /0.024 ** /0.012 /0.019 ** /0.017
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Cardiovascular /0.028 ** /0.031 ** /0.029 * /0.031 ** /0.020
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015)
Cancer /0.004 /0.009 0.000 /0.001 /0.020
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.020)
Other /0.023 * /0.030 * /0.016 /0.032 ** 0.002
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019)
State$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent-variable
Coefficient-on-Post05*Elderly
Full-sample Gender Race
Male Female White NonGwhite
(1)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 1997-2012 National
Vital Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age group a in state s in year t. Each
row and column corresponds to a separate regression for a specific cause of death used as an outcome
variable in equation (3.2). The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51).
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the
square-root of population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.8: E↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66, using data from 2002-2007
Any$Cause$of$Death /0.023 * /0.035 ** /0.010 /0.016 /0.040 *
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019)
Cardiovascular /0.049 ** /0.065 ** /0.028 /0.041 * /0.068 *
(0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.027)
Cancer /0.003 0.001 /0.010 0.004 /0.036
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.036)
Other /0.017 /0.038 0.009 /0.019 /0.001
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.018) (0.034)
State$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year$fixed$effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent-variable
Coefficient-on-Post05*Elderly
Full-sample Gender Race
Male Female White NonGwhite
(1)
Notes: This table shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator and the post-2005 indicator from equation (3.2) using data from the 2002-2007 National
Vital Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age group a in state s in year t. Each
row and column corresponds to a separate regression for a specific cause of death used as an outcome
variable in equation (3.2). The number of observations in each regression is equal to 816 (=8*2*51).
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the
square-root of population. * Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 1 percent.
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Figure B.1: Placebo exercise: event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on
mortality at age 66, for deaths due to external causes
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Notes: Figure shows estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly indicator
variable and the indicator function from equation (3.1) using data from the 2001-2008 National Vital
Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths due to external causes for age a in state s
in year t. Other controls include log of population, an indicator variable for age group, state fixed
e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects, and time-varying state-level control variables. Dots display 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by state. Regression is weighted by
the square-root of population. The vertical line indicates 2004, the year in which the Medicare Drug
Discount and Transitional Assistance Programs began.
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Figure B.2: Event-study plot of the e↵ect of Medicare Part D on mortality at age 66,
using data from 1997-2012
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(b) Cardiovascular deaths
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(c) Cancer deaths
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(d) Other disease deaths
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Notes: Panels (a)-(d) show estimates of the coe cient on the interaction term between the elderly
indicator variable and the indicator function from equation (3.1) using data from the 1997-2012
National Vital Statistics. The dependent variable is the log of deaths for age a in state s in year
t. Control variables include log of population, an indicator variable for age group, state fixed
e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects, and time-varying state-level control variables. Dots display 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered by state. All regressions are weighted by the square-root
of population. The vertical line indicates 2004, the year in which the Medicare Drug Discount and
Transitional Assistance Programs began.
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